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THE "ROOTKIT DEBACLE":
THE LATEST CHAPTER IN THE STORY OF THE RECORDING
INDUSTRY AND THE WAR ON MUSIC PIRACY
MEGAN M. LABELLEt
ABSTRACT
In the age of digital music, illicit copying or burning of CDs is a rampant
problem that undermines the rights of copyright holders, record labels,
and artists alike. The recording industry has attempted to address this
problem by manufacturing and releasing CDs with various types of digi-
tal rights management (DRM) technologies. Most recently, Sony BMG
introduced CDs containing DRM software that was intended, among
other things, to limit the number of copies of the CD the user could make,
and prevent the user from sharing the content of the CD on peer-to-peer
networks. However, the manner in which this software operated was
highly controversial, for example because it collected information from
the user's computer and installed a "rootkit" on the user's hard drive
that made the computer susceptible to viruses. This latest effort to copy-
protect CDs, which has come to be known as the "rootkit debacle," has
raised numerous legal issues that are examined in this article, including
Sony BMG's potential liability under certain federal and state laws, as
well as the potential liability of consumers and security researchers un-
der the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The article also proposes a
solution for striking a balance between the recording industry's right to
protect its intellectual property and music fans' right to enjoy their CDs.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the recording industry's war on piracy has fo-
cused on music downloaded from the Internet and file sharing. As a re-
sult of recent court victories, the recording industry now appears to have
the upper hand in the on-line file sharing battle. While this battle cer-
tainly is not over, this respite has given the record labels an opportunity
to focus on another alleged culprit in the struggles of the music business:
the copying or "burning" of compact discs (CDs).
The recording industry is well aware of the impact that burned CDs
have had on its business. As one industry leader said, "[m]usic copied
onto blank recordable CDs is becoming a bigger threat to the bottom line
of record stores and music labels than online file-sharing."' Indeed, for
several years now, the major music labels have been experimenting with
digital rights management (DRM) and other anti-piracy technologies
that, among other things, would prevent consumers from converting their
CDs into computer files, limit the number of copies of a CD a consumer
could make, and/or render CDs unplayable on certain types of audio
equipment.
Nevertheless, until recently, discussions about whether CDs in-
cluded DRM were reserved for Internet bloggers, outspoken consumer
groups, and serious music fans. In 2005, that all changed when Sony
BMG (Sony) released dozens of albums by popular artists with DRM
software installed on the CD.2  The purpose of this software was to
thwart music piracy and protect Sony's intellectual property, while at the
same time providing customers with flexibility in playing their music.
Specifically, the software allowed customers to make up to three copies
of the CD and play the content on multiple platforms, while attempting
to prevent excessive copying and sharing of music on peer-to-peer web-
sites.3
1. Copying Music Now Threatens Business Like File-Sharing Did, ASSOCIATED PRESS (New
York), Aug. 15, 2005, at 12.
2. See Sony Tests Technology to Limit CD Burning, REUTERS, June 1, 2005,
http://news.cnet.co.uk/digitalmusic/0,39029666,39189658,00.htm; see also Wikipedia, 2005 Sony
CD Copy Protection Scandal § 1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_SonyCDcopy_




Although Sony claims its copy-protected CDs contained warnings,
most consumers did not become aware of the software until after they
had purchased the CDs. To exacerbate matters, the software worked by
secretly installing a "rootkit" on a purchaser's hard drive when the pur-
chaser first loaded the CD on a drive connected to a computer. These
rootkits exposed the users' computers to hackers who could introduce
viruses and then exploit those viruses to their advantage. Moreover, the
software, which opponents claim is spyware, kept track of what consum-
ers did with the purchased music and then communicated that informa-
tion back to Sony.4
In early November 2005, the news of Sony's DRM software ex-
ploded on the Internet and, soon thereafter, Sony pulled approximately
fifty titles from retail stores.5 Though some people find DRM inherently
objectionable, the widespread outrage may have had more to do with the
manner in which the software operated than with the purposes it served.
In any event, Sony's use of this specific DRM tool has disillusioned con-
sumers, lawmakers, and artists alike. Consequently, several consumer
class action lawsuits and one law enforcement action have been filed
against Sony.6 Settlements have now been reached in many of these
cases, and Sony has agreed, among other things, to replace CDs contain-
ing DRM software with unprotected versions and to stop using the spe-
cific type of DRM software at issue in these lawsuits.
7
But this is not the end of the story. The "rootkit debacle" has raised
numerous legal questions that remain unanswered. These questions are
sure to rear their heads again, especially given that Sony and the other
record labels have made clear that they are not abandoning future efforts
to protect CDs from unfair copying. This article attempts to resolve
these unanswered questions.
Part I of this article provides a background of the recording indus-
try's war against music piracy over the past several years. Part II de-
scribes Sony's latest effort to copy-protect CDs, which has become
4. Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far,
SYSINTERNALS BLOG, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/2005/10/sony-rootkits-and-
digital-rights.html; Mark Ward, Sony's Music Arm Has Been Accused of Using the Tactics of Virus
Writers to Stop its CDs Being Illegally Copied, BBC.com, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/4400148.stm; Matthew Fordahl, Sony to Offer Patch To Reveal Hidden Copy-protection
Software, ASSOCIATED PRESS (San Jose, Calif.), Nov. 12, 2005.
5. Sony-BMG Flushes DRM Down the Toilet, SILICON VALLEY SLEUTH, Nov. 15, 2005,
http://www.siliconvalleysleuth.com/2005/11/sonybmgflushes.html.
6. Sony Sued Over Copy-protected CDs, BBC.com, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4424254.stm; Sony BMG CD Technologies Settlement, Apr.
7, 2006 (last updated), http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com.
7. See Sony BMG, Important Legal Notices/Software Update Notice,
http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). "If You Bought, Received or Used a SONY
BMG Music Entertainment CD Containing Either XCP or Media Max Content Protection Software,
Your Rights May Be Affected By a Class Action Settlement, And You Should Download Updates
For That Software." Id.
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known as the "rootkit debacle." Part III analyzes the legal questions
raised by the Sony rootkit debacle, including whether: (i) Sony violated
certain anti-fraud and spyware-related laws by distributing CDs with
copy-prevention software; (ii) Sony's copy-protected CDs comported
with copyright law, namely the fair use doctrine; and (iii) consumers'
removal of the copy-prevention software or distribution of information
about how to remove such software violated the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution that attempts to
strike a balance between the recording industry's right to protect its intel-
lectual property and a consumer's right to enjoy purchased music.
I. BACKGROUND: THE MUSIC INDUSTRY'S WAR ON PIRACY
Less than ten years ago the music business was booming. In 1999,
CD sales totaled $14.6 billion with approximately 1.5 billion units
shipped worldwide. 8 The business grew at an annual rate of greater than
6 %, and everyone involved made a lot of money. 9
Since 1999, the recording industry has experienced a serious
downward trend. By 2003 the number of units shipped was down
31 %,10 and CD sales had fallen to $11.2 billion.1' Consequently, in an
effort to save money, record labels have laid off employees, ditched art-
ists, cut tour and video budgets, and reissued old albums rather than pro-
duce and promote new ones. 12 While numerous factors have contributed
to this decline, the major culprit is music piracy-both in the form of file
sharing and CD burning. 13  Thus, over the past several years, the re-
cording industry has invested significant time and resources waging war
against these pirates in an attempt to regain the success it once enjoyed.
8. Jefferson Graham et al., Hammering Away at Piracy, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2003, at I D;
NARM Consumer Research Initiative Phase One: Consumer Profiles & Retail Experience, Prepared




9. Graham et al., supra note 8, at 1D.
10. NARM, supra note 8, at 11.
11. Kristina Groennings, Costs & Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation Against
Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005).
12. Hillary M. Kowalski, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing & Technological Sabotage Tactics: No
Legislation Required, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 297, 301 (2004); David Segal, A New Tactic
in the Download War: Online "Spoofing' Turns the Tables on Music Pirates, WASH. POST, Aug.
21, 2002, at Al.
13. Some have blamed the decline in record sales on the nation's economic downturn. See
Peter K. Yu, P2P & the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 765 n.15 (2005).
Others contend that people are buying less music because they have so many other entertainment
options. See NARM, supra note 8, at 16.
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A. The First Phase: On-Line File Sharing
1. The Battle Against Indirect Infringers
Thus far, the recording industry's war on piracy has focused primar-
ily on indirect infringers, i.e., companies whose products facilitate the
downloading and file sharing of copyrighted music. The most well
known of these alleged indirect infringers was Napster, a peer-to-peer
file sharing service that utilized a centralized index of music files and
allowed those files to be transferred from one Napster user's computer to
another.14  Napster's emergence in late 1999 coincided with the sharp
decline in CD sales. The Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") responded on behalf of its members by suing Napster on the
grounds of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.15 After
years of protracted litigation, the RIAA defeated Napster, ultimately
forcing it into bankruptcy.
1 6
Although the Napster litigation was a success for the recording in-
dustry, it did not put an end to on-line file sharing. Instead, Napster us-
ers migrated to decentralized file sharing services such as Grokster.
17
Such services did not have a centralized index like Napster, but rather,
distributed software that allowed users to share electronic files through
peer-to-peer networks.' 8 In 2001, the RIAA filed suit against Grokster
and StreamCast Networks, another software distributor, asserting the
same theories as in the Napster case. 19 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the software companies because (i) their soft-
ware was capable of substantial non-infringing use, and (ii) they had no
actual knowledge of infringement by their customers.20  The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed.2 '
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Grokster
case and reversed.22  In so doing, the Court found that close to 90% of
14. Mark F. Radcliffe & Jill Sazama, Napster & Hollywood: Controlling Intellectual Property
in an Age of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Digital Video Recorders, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.
CLE, 2002 WL 32152238, at *2 (Nov. 14-15, 2002).
15. See Complaint for Contributory and Vicious Copyright Infringement at 2, A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affirmed by 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) available at http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/pdf/napster/NapsterComplaint.pdf. Soon after
it sued Napster, the recording industry also brought a lawsuit against MP3.com, which had launched
"myMP3.com," a service that allowed users to play songs that the users "owned" from MP3.com's
servers. Radcliffe & Sazama, supra note 14, at *2. However, MP3.com did not have the consent of
the copyright owners to make these copies or provide this service. Id. The record labels and other
copyright owners were granted injunctive relief against MP3.com and the cases were quickly settled.
Id.; see generally RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/mp3com.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
16. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 899. In 2003, Napster was re-launched as a legal, sub-
scription-based on-line music store. See Yu, supra note 13, at 669-70.
17. Groennings, supra note l1, at 573.
18. Id.
19. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
20. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041-43.
21. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004).
22. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2270 (2005).
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the files downloaded with defendants' software were copyrighted.23 The
Court further found that defendants promoted their software as an alter-
native to Napster, and thus, encouraged users to engage in infringing
activity. 24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the software com-
panies were liable for their customers' infringement, reversed the sum-
mary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.25 As a result of
the Supreme Court's decision, the parties settled the case and Grokster
was shut down.26
2. The Battle Against Direct Infringers
In August 2003, the music industry made the bold and controversial
decision to bring copyright suits against direct infringers, i.e., individuals
who engage in music downloading and file sharing. For the most part,
the RIAA filed these suits against individuals who were heavy users,
meaning they had distributed more than a thousand music files on peer-
to-peer networks.27 As of February 2006, approximately 17,765 of these
individual copyright infringement lawsuits had been filed.28
The media, public, and legal commentators have been highly critical
of this litigation strategy, for example because the RIAA has sued col-
lege students, deceased persons, and a family that did not own a com-
puter.29 It is clear, however, that these lawsuits have raised public
awareness of the illegality of music downloading and file sharing.
Moreover, studies indicate that the user bases of those services that have
been targets of the litigation (e.g., KaZaa and Morpheus) have decreased
dramatically since the RIAA started its campaign in 2003.30
3. Technological Measures
In addition to filing lawsuits, the recording industry has utilized
various technological measures to battle individual downloaders and file
sharers. The most effective, and perhaps most controversial, of these is
23. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
24. Id. at 2773.
25. Id. at 2782-83.
26. See RJAA, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/I 10705_2.asp (last visited Sept. 15,
2006). The settlement includes a permanent injunction against the software companies prohibiting
direct or indirect infiingement of any copyrighted works. The injunction also requires the software
companies to cease distributing their products and operating their systems. Id.
27. Yu, supra note 13, at 666.
28. RIAA site, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/default.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
29. Groennings, supra note 11, at 590-91; Yu, supra note 13, at 660-61; RIAA website,
http://www.riaa.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Computer-Less Fam-
ily, 234 Others, for File-Sharing, ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 24, 2006,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060424-6662.html.
30. NARM, supra note 8, at 14. However, some studies show that "though litigation caused a
decrease in the use of networks ... targeted by the lawsuits, overall file-sharing has remained un-
changed, as users of those sites simply migrated to more secure and anonymous file-sharing sys-
tems." Groennings, supra note 11, at 587; see also Thomas Karagiannis et al., Is P2P Dying or Just
Hiding?, GLOBAL INTERNET AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKs, Nov. 2004, at I, 6,
http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2004/p2p-dying/.
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"spoofing." Spoofing is a technique whereby the record industry inserts
decoy music files into peer-to-peer networks, thus forcing file sharers to
differentiate between the genuine and "fake" files.31 Some of these
"fake" files contain high-pitched screeching sounds, long silences, or
repeated loops of the song's chorus. Others contain a message from the
artist reminding the file sharer that unauthorized downloading is illegal
and harms, not only the record companies, but the artists as well.33
Another tactic that reportedly has been used is interdiction.34 Music
companies flood peer-to-peer networks with false requests in order to
clog up the network, thereby denying other users the ability to access and
download music files. 35  The hope is that peer-to-peer users ultimately
will get frustrated enough to stop using these services, and will switch to
a legitimate site like iTunes or will purchase the CD at a retail outlet.36
B. The Second Phase: CD Copying or "Burning"
1. Identifying the Problem
Unlike the on-line file sharing battle, the recording industry has not
engaged in any sort of litigation campaign, either against indirect or di-
rect infringers, to stop individuals from copying CDs from friends or
acquaintances. The reasons for this are simple. There are no secondary
infringers like Napster or Grokster assisting these individuals in copying
CDs; all these individuals need is a borrowed CD and a computer. 37 Fur-
31. Sue Zeidler, Music Labels Plant Online Decoys, Mull Lawsuits, ELECTRONIC MUSICIAN,
July 5, 2002, http://emusician.com/news/emusic_music_labelsplant/index.html; Katie Dean, Aca-
demics Patent P2P Spoofing, WIRED NEWS, May 8, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/
digiwood/0,1412,63384,00.html.
32. Groennings, supra note 11, at 593.
33. Id.; Yu, supra note 13, at 726-27.
34. Kowalski, supra note 12, at 303; Dean, supra note 31; Karagiannis et al., supra note 30, at
6.
35. Kowalski, supra note 12, at 303; Dean, supra note 3 1.
36. Other technological measures that have been contemplated include a program called a
"freeze" and a program called a "silence." Kowalski, supra note 12, at 302-03.
37. Because of the digital format, copying CDs, unlike records or cassettes, can be accom-
plished quickly and easily and result in a very high quality duplicate. See, e.g., Amy K. Jensen,
Copy Protection of CDs: The Recording Industry's Latest Attempt at Preventing the Unauthorized
Digital Distribution of Music, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 241, 244 (2003). CDs can
be copied on any computer with a CD-ROM or on a digital audio recording device, i.e., a CD burner
or CDR. In 1992, however, Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), Pub.
L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (West 2006)), which "prohib-
its legal actions for copyright infringement based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of
digital audio equipment or media for private, noncommercial recording." Yu, supra note 13, at 706;
see also Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 380 (2003). The AHRA also prohibits infringement actions against the
consumers of these products as long as they are being used for a noncommercial purpose. 17
U.S.C.A. § 1008. In exchange, the AHRA requires manufacturers of these products to pay compen-
satory royalties to copyright holders, 17 U.S.C.A. § 1003(a), and mandates that all such products
include a Serial Copy Management System, which limits copying. 17 U.S.C.A § 1002(c).
In light of the AHRA, it would be particularly difficult for the recording industry to bring a lawsuit
against the manufacturers and users of CD burners unless it could show that the equipment was not
being used for private or noncommercial purposes. In any event, most people today copy CDs on
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thermore, based on past experience, the recording industry has realized
that suing the manufacturers of computers for contributory infringement
is unlikely to advance their cause.38
Nor has the RIAA launched a litigation campaign against individu-
als who copy CDs as it has against on-line file sharers because it would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify these people. The
RIAA tracks on-line infringers by their numerical IP address, files a
"Doe" lawsuit using that IP address, and then subpoenas the internet ser-
vice provider (ISP) to obtain the subscriber's identifying information.3
By contrast, the RIAA has no way of knowing when someone borrows a
CD from his friend, copies it onto his hard drive, and then downloads it
onto a blank CD or MP3 player.
Yet the recording industry is well aware of the danger posed by
these CD burners. 40  Record executives have long argued that CD bum-
ing has become so widespread in Europe that it is a bigger threat than
unauthorized online file sharing.41  And a recent study prepared for the
National Association of Recording Merchandisers (NARM), a trade or-
ganization that represents the interests of major music retailers, indicates
that this also may be true in the United States.42 The study shows that, in
2004, only 43% of fans acquired their music by purchasing a physical
CD, while 29% copied a CD, 22% used an illegal peer-to-peer network,
their computers, not with a CD burner, and it has been determined that the AHRA does not apply to
computers. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
38. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984), the
Supreme Court held that, even though defendants were aware VCRs were being used to commit
infringement, the sale of VCRs could not give rise to contributory infringement because the VCR
was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses, namely time-shifting. Here, manufac-
turers of computers and CDRs could similarly prove that their products are capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses, and thus, any lawsuit against them is likely to fail. See id.
39. Groennings, supra note 11, at 574. This is a much more tedious process than the RIAA
initially used. Id. at 573. When the RIAA first started filing these individual lawsuits, it relied on
the subpoena power of § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Id. at 574.
Under § 512(h), before filing the lawsuit, the RIAA could provide the ISP with "$35, a copy of
notification, the proposed subpoena, and a sworn declaration that the information sought was for the
sole purpose of protecting copyright," and the ISP was compelled to disclose the subscriber's identi-
fying information. Id. However, in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1237
(D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that ISPs like Verizon are not subject to the
subpoena power of § 512(h) because the statute "does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an
ISP acting as a mere conduit for the transmission of information sent by others." Id. Thus, ISPs fall
under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA, and copyright holders cannot force them to provide
subscriber information without first filing a lawsuit. Id. at 1236.
40. Copying Music Now Threatens Business Like File-Sharing Did, supra note I, at 12.
41. Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2002, 3, at I; see also Sony's 'Copy-Proof CD Fails to Silence Hackers, USA TODAY, May 20,
2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/tech/2002-05-20-copyproof-cd.htm (stating that
Germany is "rife with illegal CD burning").
42. NARM, supra note 8, at 12. This study was prepared by the NPD group, a research
organization based in New York that is concerned with the digital music market. See Thomas Men-





and 6% used legitimate on-line music sites.43 Therefore, the recording
industry has taken a different approach to try to stop illegal copying of
CDs: digital rights management.
2. Digital Rights Management: The Solution to CD Burning?
Digital rights management (DRM) is a technology used to protect
ownership of digital content by restricting the actions an authorized re-
cipient may take with respect to that content.44  In other words, DRM
systems include "secure packaging and delivery software designed to
prevent purchasers and third parties from making unauthorized uses of
digital works. ' '4
For years, the recording industry has been attempting to prevent or
limit unauthorized copying by producing CDs with an effective DRM
system. So far, however, those attempts have been unsuccessful.46 In
2000, for example, the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), an inter-
national organization of record labels, hardware manufacturers, and
software manufacturers, challenged computer programmers and re-
searchers to break the digital audio watermark technologies they had
developed to prevent the unauthorized copying of CDs.4 7 "Digital wa-
termarks contain data, such as copyright information, that identifies a
work and is incorporated into the work itself; watermarking allows the
content owner to track the use of his work and ensure payment.,
48
Edward Felten, a professor of computer science and public affairs at
Princeton University, participated in the contest. 49  Professor Felten's
team was able to remove the watermark within just a few weeks, which
proved embarrassing for the recording industry. 50 To make matters
worse, when Professor Felten attempted to present his findings about the
watermark at a conference in 2001, the RIAA and SDMI threatened to
43. NARM, supra note 8, at 12.
44. Austin Russ, Digital Rights Management Overview, SECURITY ESSENTIALS, VOL. 1.2e
(July 2001), available at http://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/basics/434.php.
45. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems,
15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 41, 48 (2001).
46. The film industry, too, has experienced problems with its use of DRM on digital video
discs (DVDs). In the 1990s, it developed the Content Scrambling System (CSS) to encrypt and
prevent illegal copying of DVDs. However, Jon Lech Johansen, a Norwegian teenager, cracked the
CSS code and posted his findings on the Internet. See Norwegian Teen Raided by Police in DVD
Suit, Jan. 25, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/ptech/01/25/dvd.charge/index.html. Crimi-
nal charges were brought against Johansen, but he was ultimately acquitted. See lain Thomson,
Norwegian Court Clears 'DVD Jon,' Jan. 8, 2003, http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2121179/
norwegian-court-clears-dvd-jon.
47. Robin D. Gross, Digital Millennium Dark Ages, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
Nov. 7, 2001, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-vRIAA/20011107_eff felten article.html;
Brad King, Real Progress in Secure Music, WIRED NEWS, June 7, 2001, at 2,
http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,44365-I .html?tw=wnstory_pagenextl.
48. Terri Branstetter Cohen, Anti-Circumvention: Has Technology's Child Turned Against Its
Mother?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 961, 973-74 (2003).
49. Gross, supra note 47.
50. Id.; Groennings, supra note 11, at 592.
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sue him under the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, which prohibits "circumvent[ing] a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under" the
copyright statute.5
No lawsuit was ever brought against Professor Felten; instead, Pro-
fessor Felten sued for a declaratory judgment that publication of his pa-
per would not violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.5 2 In re-
sponse to the lawsuit, the RIAA and SDMI assured Professor Felten that
they would not bring a lawsuit against him. 53 Ultimately, the case was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Professor Felten
subsequently published and presented his paper without any further resis-
tance from the RIAA or SDMI. 4 Needless to say, the recording industry
decided against distributing CDs with the watermarking technology.
In 2001, record labels began releasing CDs that included copy-
protection technology intended to prevent consumers from listening to
the CD on a computer and/or copying its contents onto the computer's
hard drive. 55 Specifically, these CDs included a decoy data track on the
outer edge of the CD.56 Because of the way hard drives are programmed,
a computer will continuously attempt to read this data track first before
moving on to the audio tracks. 57 Thus, these copy-protected CDs could
be played on standard CD players, but not on computers, certain portable
devices, DVD players, and even some car stereos. 8
The problems created by these copy-protected CDs resulted in more
negative publicity for the record companies. Many consumers returned
the CDs and demanded replacements without the anti-copying technol-
ogy.59  Others chose to fix it themselves-and all they needed was a
magic marker or some tape.
51. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a); Gross, supra note 47; Andrea L. Foster, Princeton Cryptogra-
pher's Challenge to Music Industry Draws Computer Scientists' Support, THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION, Aug. 16, 2001, http://chronicle.com/free/2001/08/2001081602t.htm; Letter
from Matthew J. Oppenheim, Esq., Senior Vice President, Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica, to Professor Edward Felton [sic], Princeton University (Apr. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-vRIAA/20010409_riaa sdmi-letter.html.
52. Gross, supra note 47,
53. Foster, supra note 51.
54. Gross, supra note 47; Transcript of Final Hearing at 48, Felten v. RIAA, No. 01 CV 2669,
(D. N.J. 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/1P/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_
transcript.pdf.
55. See Simple Crack Revealed for CD Copy Protection, MEDIALINE, May 22, 2002,
http://www.medialinenews.com/issues/2002/may/news0522-7.shtrnl.
56. Id.
57. Sony's 'Copy-Proof CD Fails to Silence Hackers, supra note 41.
58. Id; CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed, WIRED NEWS, May 20, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,52665,00.html; Healey & Leeds, supra note 41, at 2.
59. John Borland, Customers Put Kibosh on Anti-Copy CD, CNET NEWS, (Nov. 19, 2001),
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276036.html; Universal to Protect U.S. Album Release, REUTERS,
Nov. 28, 2001, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-276341.html.
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When the additional track is hidden from the computer's laser by ink
from a marker, a piece of electrical tape, or a piece of a self-stick
memo, the computer does not attempt to read the additional track and
moves on to the tracks that store the actual content, as if the CD were
an ordinary audio disc.
60
News of this "easy fix" quickly spread on the Internet, once again embar-
rassing the music companies that had invested significant time and re-
sources developing this technology.
6 1
II. THE STORY OF THE SONY ROOTKIT




Despite the previous failed attempts, the recording industry did not
give up on finding a marketable and secure anti-copying technology. To
that end, the record labels, including Sony, sent their engineers back to
the drawing board to try to find a solution to the threat posed by CD
burning.64 As a result, in the fall of 2003, Sony began releasing CDs
with a new anti-copying technology called "MediaMax. 6 5
Sony released CDs with two versions of the MediaMax software,
3.0 and 5.0, both of which were developed by SunnComm Technologies
("SunnComm").66 MediaMax was like the previous generation of copy-
prevention DRM in that it was intended to prevent consumers from using
personal computers for unauthorized CD burning.67 Unlike earlier DRM,
however, MediaMax did not completely prohibit playing CDs on a com-
60. Cohen, supra note 48, at 995 n.7.
61. See CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed, supra note 58.
62. See generally J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM
Episode (Feb. 14, 2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf (providing a more de-
tailed technical analysis).
63. There are two versions of the MediaMax software: 3.0 and 5.0. Settlement Agreement
I.A-B, In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig., No. l:05-cv-09575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/pdfs/SettlementAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement]. For the most part, these versions are the same and will be discussed together. Where
necessary, this article will distinguish between the two versions.
64. See Healey & Leeds, supra note 4 1, at 2.
65. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, L.A-B; J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Me-
diaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System, (Oct. 6, 2003), http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhalderm/cd3/.
Sony distributed a total of 37 titles with the MediaMax 3.0 software and 27 titles with the 5.0 ver-
sion, including albums by popular artists such as the Dave Matthews Band, the Foo Fighters, Dido,
Alicia Keys, and Sarah McLachlan. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, Ex. A.
66. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, l.A-B. SunnComm is "a leader in digital content
security and enhancement for optical media." Press Release, SunnComm International,
SunnComm's MediaMax CD-3 Technology Passes International Test With "Flying Colors," (Aug.
27, 2003), available at http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelease.asp?prid=20030827630 [here-
inafter SunnComm Press Release].
67. See Halderman, supra note 65.
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puter, but instead, limited the number of copies a user could make. 68
Specifically, it permitted users to do the following: (i) copy tracks onto
the user's hard drive that could be played back without the original CD;
(ii) bum tracks onto a blank CD up to three times; (iii) download tracks
to certain portable devices;69 and (iv) email tracks to friends who could
listen to them for ten days.70
While the purpose and goal of the MediaMax DRM appear fair, the
methods used to implement it, arguably, were not. When a CD contain-
ing the MediaMax program was inserted in a computer, an End User
License Agreement (EULA) automatically appeared on the screen.71 The
EULA stated:
As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions
of the EULA, this CD will automatically install a small proprietary
software program (the "SOFTWARE") onto your computer. The
SOFTWARE is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the
CD, and it may also facilitate your use of the DIGITAL CONTENT.
Once installed, the SOFTWARE will reside on YOUR COMPUTER
until removed or deleted .... [T]he SOFTWARE will not be used at
any time to collect any personal information from you, whether
stored on your computer or otherwise.
72
68. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint 1 24, In re Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig.,
No. 1:05-cv-09575-NRB (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/
pdfs/ConsolidatedAmendedComplaint.pdf [hereinafter Sony Complaint].
69. CDs containing the MediaMax software are only compatible with Sony and Microsoft
products and software, so those are the only portable devices that the tracks can be loaded onto. Id.
70. Halderman, supra note 65; Mike Snider, Anti-Swap CD Hits the Racks, U.S.A. TODAY,
Sept. 22, 2003, at 6D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techinnovations/2003-09-22-
copycd x.htm. The MediaMax EULA describes the function of the DRM as follows:
This CD contains technology that is designed to prevent users from making certain, unau-
thorized uses of the DIGITAL CONTENT, including, without limitation, the following:
(1) making and storing more than one (1) copy of the DIGITAL CONTENT in each
available file format on the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER; (2) accessing the
DIGITAL CONTENT on YOUR COMPUTER (once you have installed a copy of it on
the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER) using a media player that is not an APPROVED
MEDIA PLAYER; (3) transferring copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT that reside on the
hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER on to portable devices that are not APPROVED
PORTABLE DEVICES; (4) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL
CONTENT stored on YOUR COMPUTER (ATRAC OpenMG file format only) onto
AtracCDs; (5) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT onto re-
cordable compact discs in the so-called "Red Book"-compliant audio file format; and (6)
burning more than three (3) backup copies of this CD (using the burning application pro-
vided on the CD) onto recordable CDs and burning or otherwise making additional cop-
ies from the resulting backup copies.
Melcon v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, No. C 05 5084 MHP (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2005), Ex. A at 2-3,
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/ND cal-complaint.pdf [hereinafter Melcon
Complaint].
71. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G. The copy-prevention software only installs if
the Windows "Autorun" feature is enabled, which it generally is because that is the default setting.
Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 5.
72. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 1 21 & Ex. A.
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In fact, however, the MediaMax software files (which consisted of more
than a dozen files at approximately 15 MB) are loaded onto the computer
before the user is given the opportunity to accept the EULA.7 3
MediaMax employs a temporary protection measure in order to pre-
vent the user from copying music when the EULA is being displayed
(i.e., when the CD is first inserted in the computer).74 This "temporary"
protection measure installs and activates the anti-copying software before
the EULA is even presented to the user. 75 The software, therefore, is
installed without obtaining the user's consent.
Even worse, if the user rejects the EULA, the MediaMax software
remains on the hard drive.76 Although rejecting the EULA is supposed to
deactivate the software, that is not always the case. 77 In certain situa-
tions, the software remains permanently active.78 For example, if the
user inserts a MediaMax 3.0 CD and then later inserts a MediaMax 5.0
CD (or vice versa), the software will be active despite the user's prior
decision to decline the EULA.79 Similarly, inserting a 5.0 CD, rebooting
your computer, and then inserting the same album or another CD with
the 5.0 software will lead to the same result.
80
The MediaMax software also loads a type of device driver onto the
computer's hard drive to prevent copying.81 With respect to the 3.0 ver-
sion, "[t]he driver examines each CD placed in the machine, and when it
recognizes the protected title, it actively interferes with read operations
on the audio content., 82 Similarly, the 5.0 version causes a "kernel-level
driver" to be installed on the computer, the purpose of which is "to block
CD ripping and copying applications from reading the audio tracks on
MediaMax CDs. 83
In addition to the obvious problems with the manner in which it was
installed, the MediaMax software caused other concerns, namely, that it
exchanged information between the user's computer and Sony.84 More
specifically, the MediaMax program collects personal information, in-
cluding (i) the user's IP address, (ii) the type of operating system on the
user's computer, (iii) the version of Internet Explorer installed on the
user's computer, and (iv) the title of the MediaMax CD that the user cur-
73. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.
74. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
75. Id.; Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.





81. Halderman, supra note 65.
82. Id.
83. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 18.
84. Id. 25; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
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rently has loaded on his computer.85 In light of this evidence, the state-
ment in the EULA that "the software will not be used at any time to col-
lect any personal information from you, whether stored on YOUR
COMPUTER or otherwise, 86 appears inaccurate.
2. XCP
In January 2005, Sony began releasing CDs with a different DRM
system known as Extended Copy Protection or XCP. 87 Various versions
of XCP were designed and licensed to Sony by First 4 Internet Ltd.
("F4i"), 88 a developer of content management technology based in the
United Kingdom.89 Like MediaMax, the purpose of the XCP technology
was to limit, but not preclude, the use of personal computers to copy
CDs.90 For instance, XCP allowed users to make up to three copies of
the CD, but tracks could only be played with the media player that was
included with the CD and could only be downloaded to certain types of
portable players. 91
Also like MediaMax, the way that XCP installed itself and operated
was fraught with complications. When an XCP CD was inserted in a
computer, a EULA automatically appeared on the screen.92 Among other
things, the EULA provided:
Before you can play the audio files on YOUR COMPUTER or create
and/or transfer the DIGITAL CONTENT to YOUR COMPUTER,
you will need to review and agree to be bound by an end user license
agreement or "EULA" .... [I]f you do not agree to be bound by
these terms and conditions, you will not be able to utilize the audio
files or the DIGITAL CONTENT on YOUR COMPUTER.
93
85. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 25; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27. The Me-
diaMax software also allegedly contains an advertising program called "Perfect Placement."
SunnComm described this program in a 2005 press release:
This unique feature centrally serves up dynamic promotional content controlled by the
record label to reserved spaces located throughout MediaMax interface while a user is en-
joying their CD on the computer .... Imagine an artist's album is coming out and the re-
cord company has the ability to announce this event to all those playing the artist's previ-
ously released album on their computer.
Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 32.
86. See Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 22 & Ex. A.
87. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 23. Sony released a total of 52 albums with XCP soft-
ware. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, Ex. A.
88. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.B.
89. F4i Company Page, http://www.first4intemet.co.uk/company.aspx (last visited Sept. 15,
2006).
90. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 24.
91. Russinovich, supra note 4; Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far,
SYSINTERNALS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2005), http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/2005/10/sony-rootkits-and-
digital-rights.html; see also Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 24. The XCP EJLA explaining what
the user could and could not do with the CD was exactly the same as on the MediaMax EULA. See
Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B, Art. 2-3.
92. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.
93. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B at 2.
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Hence, if the user wanted to play the CD on a computer, he had no
choice but to accept the EULA. Once the user accepted the EULA, it
would not be displayed again when another CD with XCP software was
loaded onto that user's computer.94 So the user was given just one op-
portunity to read the following language:
As soon as you have agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions
of the EULA, this CD will automatically install a small proprietary
software program... onto YOUR COMPUTER. The SOFTWARE
is intended to protect the audio files embodied on the CD, and it may
also facilitate your use of the DIGITAL CONTENT. Once installed,
the SOFTWARE will reside on YOUR COMPUTER until removed
or deleted. However, the SOFTWARE will not be used at any time
to collect any personal information from you, whether stored on
YOUR COMPUTER or otherwise.
95
Unlike MediaMax, XCP did not use a temporary protection measure
that installed software before the EULA was accepted by the user. In-
stead, XCP prevented copying during the installation process by monitor-
ing the list of applications that were running on the user's computer at
the time the EULA was being displayed in order to determine if the user
was running a "blacklisted" ripping and copying application.96 If such an
application was found, the EULA was replaced with a warning instruct-
ing the user to close the offending application within 30 seconds or the
XCP installation would terminate and the CD would be ejected.97
Once installed, however, the XCP software was far more dangerous
than the MediaMax program because it "contains a potentially harmful
'rootkit' which renders the user's computer more vulnerable to 'mal-
ware' promulgated by third parties, including 'viruses,' 'Trojan Horses'
and 'spyware,' than the computers would have been had the XCP Soft-
ware not been installed., 98 The XCP EULA says nothing about this
rootkit.99
A rootkit is "a set of software tools frequently used by a third party
(usually an intruder) after gaining access to a computer system. These
tools are intended to conceal running processes, files or system data,
which helps an intruder maintain access to a system without the user's
94. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 128.
95. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B 3.
96. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, § 4.2.1.
97. Id The warning stated:
The installation cannot continue because there are applications running which need to be
closed. Please manually close all programs shown in the list below, or click "Close Ap-
plications Now" to do it automatically. If you do not close these down within the al-
lowed period then the installation will terminate until you next insert the disc.
Id.
98. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.E.
99. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B.
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knowledge."' 00  Rootkits are not visible to a computer's operating
system, nor can they be detected by antivirus and security software.' 0'
Here, the Sony rootkit functioned by integrating itself in the com-
puter's operating system and then concealing all files that began with
"$sys$," which included the XCP copy-prevention software. 0 2 The dan-
ger of this "cloaking mechanism" is that any file can be made invisible to
the user by assigning it a name that begins with "$sys$.', 0 3  Conse-
quently, users who have played Sony CDs containing XCP software on
their computers are left vulnerable to hackers. 104
Not only did the XCP software install this rootkit, but, contrary to
the EULA, it also gathered personal information from the user's com-
puter. 10 5 Like the MediaMax software, the XCP program communicated
the user's IP address and the title of the CD the user was currently play-
ing to Sony. 106 Additionally, when Sony's server received the informa-
tion about what CD was being played, it "automatically check[ed] for
updates to the album art and lyrics for that album,... [which] uses the
bandwidth that would otherwise be available to the user's computer for
other tasks.' ' 7  Thus, both the MediaMax and XCP systems "phone
home" with personal information regarding Sony's consumers.1
08
B. The Discovery of Sony's Copy Protection Technology
1. Alex Halderman and the MediaMax Software
When CDs with the MediaMax copy-prevention system were re-
leased in September 2003, it was not a secret. SunnComm issued a press
release lauding its new technology, 09 and numerous newspaper articles
100. Security Reference Guide, The Sony Rootkit: What It Is and How to Remove It,
INFORMIT.COM, para. 4 (Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.informit.com/guides/content.asp?g=security&
seqNum-192&rl=l (citation omitted).
101. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, T 52.
102. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 9 35; Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 9 51-53.
103. Sony Complaint, supra note 68,1 35.
104. Id. 36; Nancy Lang-Feldman, Sony's Rootkit Is All Evil, COMPUTER SHOPPER, 4 (Mar.
2006), http://shopper.cnet.com/4002-7409_9-6457527.html.
105. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, T I.E; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
106. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 97 59-60; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
107. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 59.
108. Bruce Schneier, Real Story of the Rogue Rootkit, WIRED NEWS, (Nov. 17, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0, 1848,69601,00.html.
109. SunnComm Press Release, supra note 66, 7 2-4. The press release stated:
MediaMax CD3 products passed all tests and met the toughest standards.... It achieved
a very high level of playability combined with an incredible level of security for the mu-
sic .... [T]he functionality and security level offered by the MediaMax technology was
pushed to the limit. The testing results were able to verify playability on consumer elec-
tronic devices, stability of the product on computers and robustness of the security fea-
tures to protect content against unauthorized copying when used with CD ripper pro-
grams [sic].
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were written on the topic. 10 Moreover, the MediaMax CDs contained
warnings. For example, the album cover stated: "This CD is protected
against unauthorized duplication. It is designed to play on standard
playback devices and an appropriately configured computer (see system
requirements on back). If you have questions or concerns visit
http://www.sunncomm.com/support/bmg..'I And the face of the CD
itself stated: "This disc is protected against unauthorized duplication."
' 12
However, consumers were not warned about the manner in which
the MediaMax program operated (i.e., that the software files were in-
stalled even if the EULA was declined), nor were they aware the soft-
ware was communicating personal information to Sony. 13 That changed
in October 2003 when J. Alex Halderman, a Ph.D. student in computer
science at Princeton University, published a paper analyzing the Media-
Max software."14 Not only did Halderman describe how the MediaMax
software worked, he explained that a user can easily bypass the software
by holding down the shift key for a few seconds while loading a CD onto
the computer. 115
Once again, the record industry's hopes for a marketable and secure
copy-protection system were quickly dashed. Mr. Halderman's publica-
110. U.S. Firm Hopes Anti-Piracy CD Will Rock Blackmarket, BUS. TIMES, I (Sept. 26,
2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20031024232303/http:/it.asial .com.sg/newsdaily/news006_2003
0926.html (reporting "SunnComm Technologies Inc. said on Wednesday it has designed a revolu-
tionary CD with embedded anti-piracy technology that it hopes will rock the black-market trade in
pirated music"); Frank Ahrens, BMG Offers Legal Song Sharing, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at
El; Jon Healey, BMG is Releasing Copy-Protected CDs, LA TIMES, Sept. 13, 2003, at C3.
111. Halderman, supra note 65, § 2. The "systems requirements" on the back of the CD pro-
vided:
THIS CD IS ENHANCED WITH MEDIAMAX SOFTWARE. Windows Compatible
Instructions: Insert disc into CD-ROM drive. Software will automatically install. If it
doesn't, click on 'LaunchCd.exe.' MacOS Instructions: Insert disc into CD-ROM drive.
Click on "Start." Usage of the CD on your computer requires your acceptance of the End
User License Agreement and installation of specific software contained on the CD. Win-
dows System Requirements: Windows 98/2000/XP, Intemet Explorer 5.5 or later, Win-
dows Media Player 7.1 or compatible player. Mac System Requirements: Mac OSX 10.1,
Power Mac G3/G4, iMac, eMac, Powerbook G3/G4, iBook with 128 Mb of RAM, Win-
dows Media Player for Mac OSX, Internet Explorer 5.2, Monitor capable of displaying
800x600 screen resolution & 256 colors (64K colors recommended), 12x or faster multi-
session-enabled CD-ROM drive, Flash Player 6. Digital files on this CD will also play on
portable devices supporting secure WMA files. Certain computers may not be able to ac-
cess the enhanced portion of this disc. None of the manufacturers, developers, or distribu-
tor make any representation or warranty, or assumes any responsibility, with respect to
the enhanced portion of this disc.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, §§ 4.2.2, 6.
114. Halderman, supra note 65. Mr. Halderman is a student of Professor Felten's and was part
of the team that removed the digital watermark in response to the SDMI challenge in 2000. See
supra Part I.B.2; see also http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jhaldermi/.
115. Halderman, supra note 65, § 3. Halderman also reported that, only four days after the
release of Comin'From Where I'm From by Anthony Hamilton (Arista Records/BMG), a CD con-
taining the MediaMax DRM, he searched peer-to-peer networks and discovered that every song from
that album was available to be downloaded. Id.
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tion was particularly devastating for SunnComm, whose stock fell nearly
25% within forty-eight hours of the paper hitting the Internet."
16
SunnComm responded by threatening to sue Halderman for violation of
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act. 117  Ultimately, however, SunnComm decided against filing suit
against Mr. Halderman, presumably because doing so would turn an al-
ready bad situation into a complete public relations nightmare.l"
8
2. Mark Russinovich and the XCP Software
In late October 2005, Mark Russinovich, a computer security ana-
lyst, discovered a hidden software program on his computer that he be-
lieved was a rootkit.1 9 Mr. Russinovich was able to trace the software
program to a Sony CD he had recently played on his computer. 2 ° Mr.
Russinovich then attempted to remove the rootkit, but realized he could
not do that without compromising his computer system. 121
After further investigation, Mr. Russinovich also discovered that the
XCP software "engage[ed] in 'phone home' behavior.' ' 122  Specifically,
the software connected to Sony's servers and provided the customer's IP
address, 123 as well as a code associated with the CD that the customer
was listening to on his computer124
On October 31 and November 4, 2005, Mr. Russinovich published
his findings about the Sony rootkit in great detail on his weblog.125 News
of Sony's potentially dangerous software program spread quickly on the
116. SunnComm Says Pointing to Shift Key "Possible Felony, " Oct. 9, 2003, available at
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/10/09/2211259&mode=nested&tid = l 23&tid= 126&tid=141
&tid=172&tid= 188&tid=93&tid=99; SunnComm Threatens Suit Over Shift Key Circumvention, Oct.
10, 2006, available at http://grep.law.harvard.edu/article.pl?sid=03/10/10/0917244; Kevin Maney,
Debate Heats Up As Student Spots Hole In CD Protection, USA TODAY, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2003- 10-26-princeton-cover-x.htm.
117. Tony Smith, SunnComm to Sue "Shift Key" Student for $10 Million, THE REGISTER, Oct.
9, 2003, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/09/sunncomm to sue shift key.
118. Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won't Sue Grad Student, CNET NEWS, Oct. 10, 2005,
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5089448.html ("SunnComm's threats had drawn enormous
attention in a short time, with some legal analysts saying a lawsuit would represent an egregious
abuse of the DMCA."); SunnComm Technologies Reverses Decision to Bring Legal Action Against
Princeton Researcher, Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelease.asp?
prid=200310101150.
119. Affidavit of Mark Russinovich in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement 7, at 2; In re Sony BMG CD Tech. Litig., Case No. 1:05-cv-09575-NRB,
7 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Russinovich Affidavit], available at http://www.sonybmgcdtech
settlement.com/pdfs/RussinovichAfflSOFinalApp-4-5-06.pdf; see also Nate Mook, Lawsuit Fights
Back Against Sony DRM, BETANEWS, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.betanews.com/
article/LawsuitFights Back Against SonyDRM/I 131635264 ("Russinovich first reported on the
software after his company's security tool recognized a "rootkit" on his machine.").
120. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 7 7-8, at 2.
121. Id. 11; Andrew Kantor, Sony: The Rootkit of All Evil?, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/andrewkantor/2005-11-17-sony-rootkitx.htm.
122. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 14, at 4-5.
123. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.E.
124. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 14, at 4-5.
125. Id. 7,14 & Exs. B & C.
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Internet, and ultimately to the mainstream media. 26  On November 10,
2005, Symantec Corporation, a computer security company, announced
that it had discovered the first XCP-related virus, which "tears down
firewalls and gives hackers access to personal computers.' 27 The public
was outraged and demanded a response from Sony.1
28
C. Sony's Response to Discovery of the Rootkit
Sony's initial response to Mr. Russinovich's discovery was to deny
any wrongdoing and defend its software.' 29 During an interview on Na-
tional Public Radio, Thomas Hesse, President of Sony's Global Digital
Business, said: "Most people I think don't even know what a rootkit is,
so why should they care about it?' 30  Mr. Hesse further indicated that
the software was only included on about twenty titles, when in fact, the
number was closer to fifty.' 3' He also admitted that the software was
cloaked "so would-be pirates can't find it and remove it."' 32 Finally, Mr.
Hesse said that "no information ever gets gathered about the user's be-
havior. No information ever gets communicated back.... This is purely
about restricting the ability to burn MP3 files in an unprotected man-
ner."
, 13 3
After further media exposure and numerous customer complaints,
Sony released a program that was supposed to remove the XCP "cloak-
ing mechanism," as well as uninstall tools for both the MediaMax and
126. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 34; Mook, supra note 119.
127. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 38; Gregg Keizer, Sony Issues Patch As Hackers
Pounce on Rootkit, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 3, 2005, http://informationweek.comn/
shared/printableArticleSrc.jhtml?articlelD= 73402819.
128. See Nate Mook, Sony to Help Remove Its DRM Rootkit, BETANEWS, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://www.betanews.com/article/SonytoHelp Remove itsDRMRootkit/l 130965475.
The comments to this news story demonstrate the outrage felt by many members of the public. Id.
Some swore off purchasing CDs, others vowed never to buy another Sony product, and some viewed
Sony's conduct as an excuse to download music illegally. As one person explained, "This is now a
reason for me to only download music illegally. They are shooting their own feet off with this crap."
Id.
129. Interview with Thomas Hesse, National Public Radio, Nov. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=4989260 [hereinafter NPR Interview]. There
is evidence that Sony learned about the rootkit and the potential problems it could cause about a
month before Mr. Russinovich published his findings on the Internet. See Steve Hamm, Sony
BMG's Costly Silence, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 29, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/nov2005/tc20051129_938966.htm. John Guarino, owner of a small PC repair
shop in New York, had been removing a mysterious rootkit from his clients' hard drives for months.
Id. He investigated the problem using a rootkit detector software manufactured by a Finnish com-
pany called F-Secure. Id. Using that software, he was able to confirm on September 30, 2005, that
the rootkit was caused by Sony copy-protected CDs. Id. Mr. Guarino notified F-Secure who con-
ducted its own investigation. Id. On October 4, F-Secure told Sony about the rootkit, and Sony, in
turn, asked F4i to investigate. Within approximately two weeks, F-Secure provided a full report to
Sony regarding the rootkit, and described XCP as a "major security risk." Id. Nevertheless, it was
Mark Russinovich, not Sony, who informed the public about the rootkit problem on October 31,
2005. Id.
130. NPR Interview, supra note 129.
131. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, Ex. A.
132. NPR Interview, supra note 129.
133. Id.
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XCP copy-prevention software. 34  However, as Mr. Russinovich and
others discovered, these software patches actually created additional
risks to users' computers.' 35  Consequently, on or about November 15,
2005, Sony announced that it would recall all CDs containing the XCP
software and would instate a consumer exchange program for those who
had already bought the copy-protected CDs.' 36  There was no similar
recall or exchange program with respect to MediaMax CDs.
D. Sony Rootkit Litigation
1. Consumer Class Action Suits
On November 1, 2005, the day after Mr. Russinovich published his
findings about the rootkit on the Internet, the first of many class action
lawsuits was filed against Sony and the manufacturers of the MediaMax
and XCP software. 137 These lawsuits alleged that Sony's "manufacture,
sale and distribution of DRM-enhanced music CDs, especially in the
absence of appropriate warnings and disclosure," 138 violated the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, the consumer fraud, false
advertising, and/or deceptive trade practices laws of several states, and
state and federal common law. 139 Because several of these lawsuits were
134. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 1 16-17; Sony Complaint, supra note 68 39-
40. However, Sony made it difficult to obtain the XCP uninstall tool. Russinovich Affidavit, supra
note 119, 17-18.
135. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 16; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 9 47-49;
Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Does Not Recommend Patch at This Time (Dec. 6, 2005)
available at http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_12.php; see also Halderman & Felten, supra
note 63, at 22-23.
136. Tom Sanders, Sony Backs Out of Rootkit Anti-Piracy Scheme, VNUNET.COM, Nov. 15,
2005, http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2146053/sony-backs-root-kit-anti-piracy; Russinovich
Affidavit, supra note 119, T 20. As of late November, however, CDs containing XCP software were
still available in stores. See Arik Hesseldahl, Spitzer Gets on Sony BMG's Case, New York Attorney
General has turned his attention to Sony BMG's copyright fiasco, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Nov.
29, 2005, http://businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2005/tc20051128_573560.htm.
On November 29, 2005 the New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer found through his
investigators that despite the recall of November 15 Sony BMG CDs with XCP were still
for sale in New York City music retail outlets. Spitzer said 'It is unacceptable that more
than three weeks after this serious vulnerability was revealed, these same CDs are still on
shelves, during the busiest shopping days of the year,' 'I strongly urge all retailers to
heed the warnings issued about these products, pull them from distribution immediately,
and ship them back to Sony.' On November 30, 2005, Massachusetts Attorney General
Tom Reilly issued a statement saying that Sony BMG CDs with XCP were still available
in Boston despite the Sony BMG recall of November 15. Attorney General Reilly
advised consumers not to purchase the Sony BMG CDs with XCP and said that he was
conducting an investigation of Sony BMG.
Wikipedia, Sony CD Copy Protection Controversy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Sony_
CD copyprotectioncontroversy; see also Hesseldahl, supra note 136.
137. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, 9 I.C., I.D. (listing lawsuits filed to date against
Sony).
138. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Final Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 6, In re: Sony BMG CD Techs. Litig., Case No. 1:05-cv-09575 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y.
2006), available at http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.compdfs/MEMOOFLAWISOFINAL
APPROVAL4-6-06.pdf [hereinafter Final App. Motion].
139. Id; Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, T 1.1. Many of the lawsuits that were filed in
California also asserted California's Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, Cal. Bus.
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filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, on December 1, 2005, those actions were consolidated and lead
counsel was appointed (hereinafter "Consolidated Action"). 1
40
In late December, the parties in the Consolidated Action reached a
settlement. On December 28, 2005, the Settlement Agreement was filed
with the court in conjunction with the parties' request for preliminary
approval of the settlement.14  In exchange for a release of all claims re-
lated to the MediaMax or XCP software, defendants agreed, among other
things, to:
(i) Recall all XCP CDs;
(ii) Maintain an ongoing exchange program so customers could receive
the CD they purchased without the copy-protection software;
(iii) Distribute a free, effective uninstall tool for both the MediaMax and
XCP software programs;
(iv) Provide cash awards and free music downloads to class members;
(v) Agree not to use DRM software to collect personal information;
142
(vi) Improve disclosures on future copy-protected CDs; and
(vii) Have an independent third party test any future copy-protection
software for security risks. 
143
The settlement benefits for customers affected by the XCP software
are clearly better than for those customers who purchased MediaMax
CDs. For example, XCP customers can elect to receive cash where Me-
diaMax customers are limited to free downloaded music. 144 Moreover,
Sony did not agree to recall MediaMax CDs as it did with XCP CDs.
The apparent reason for this is because plaintiffs believe that "Media-
Max, while harmful, does not pose the same level of danger to end users
and their computer systems as XCP, because MediaMax does not contain
& Prof. Code § 22947-22947.6. See, e.g., Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 160 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
8, 2005).
140. Final App. Motion, supra note 138, at 7.
141. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, at 1; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) ("The
court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class.").
142. However, "Personal Data" as defined in the Settlement Agreement "does not include the
IP address of the computer's Internet connection or any information with respect to an album title,
artists and tracks, or other non-personally identifiable information, that is routinely logged by SONY
BMG in connection with enhanced or connected CDs." Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, II.H
(emphasis added). Cf infra Part III.B.2. (arguing that such data does constitute personally identifi-
able information).
143. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, III.B-C, K, M, S, IV.B.3.f, h; Final App. Motion,
supra note 138, at 9-10. Sony recently settled class action suits in Canada on terms substantially
identical to those in the U.S. settlement. See Sony BMG Settles Canadian 'Rootkit' Cases; Tex. Suit
Continues, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS DAILY, Sept. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15459519
[hereinafter Sony BMG Settles Candian 'Rootkit' Cases].
144. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, 1 IlI.C, E-F.
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a rootkit that installs hidden files on an end user's system and evades
detection from firewalls, anti-spyware and anti-virus software."'
' 45
On January 6, 2006, the Court conditionally certified the class and
granted preliminary approval. 146 As of April 6, 2006, only two objec-
tions had been filed. 141 On May 22, 2006, the court held a fairness hear-
ing, and subsequently granted final approval of the settlement. 148 Class
members have until the end of 2006 to file claims, 149 so it is unclear at
this point what the total cost of this settlement will be for defendants.
2. Government Inquiries
The rootkit incident not only caught the attention of the plaintiffs'
class action bar, it spurred numerous government inquires as well. Since
December 2005, Sony has been the subject of an inquiry by the Federal
Trade Commission and has been investigated by numerous state attorney
generals and other governmental authorities throughout the United
States.'50 Indeed, Stewart Baker, the assistant secretary for policy in the
Department of Homeland Security, directed the following comments at
Sony in response to the rootkit incident: "It is very important to remem-
ber that it's your intellectual property-it's not your computer. And in
pursuit of protection of intellectual property, it's important not to defeat
or undermine the security measures that people need to adopt in these
days."15'
To date, however, only one law enforcement action has actually
been filed against Sony. On November 21, 2005, the Texas Attorney
General, Greg Abbott, sued Sony under that state's Consumer Protection
against Computer Spyware Act of 2005, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §
48.001 et seq.152 This is the first suit that has ever been brought under
the recently enacted spyware law. 153 The Texas action, which concerns
145. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, T 23.
146. Final App. Motion, supra note 138, at 10.
147. Id. at 18.
148. Anne Broache, Sony Rootkit Settlement Gets Final Nod, CNET NEWS, May 22, 2006,
http://news.com.com/Sony+rootkit+settlement+gets+final+nod/2100-1030_3-6075370.html; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(C) ("The court may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or com-
promise that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding that the settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable and adequate.").
149. Welcome to the Information Web Site for the Sony BMG CD Technologies Settlement,
http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/ImportantDates.htm (last visited September 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Welcome to the Information Website].
150. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.M; see, e.g., Kurt Opsahl, Florida AG's Office
Enters Sony BMG DRM Fray, DEEP LINKS NOTEWORTHY NEWS FROM AROUND THE INTERNET, Jan.
3, 2006, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/004292.php; Sony BMG Settles Canadian 'Rootkit'
Cases, supra note 143.
151. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 9 19.
152. Plaintiff's Original Petition, TT 14-16, State of Texas v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, LLC,
No. GV505065 (126th Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
newspubs/releases/2005/112105sonypop.pdf [hereinafter Texas Petition]; Texas Sues Sony BMG
for Spyware, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 31.
153. Texas Sues Sony BMG for Spyware, supra note 152, at 31.
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only the XCP software, makes claims similar to those asserted in the
consumer class action lawsuits discussed in the previous section.
5 4
Sony is currently in negotiations with Attorney General Abbott and
other law enforcement agents to try to settle these matters. In fact, the
Settlement Agreement in the Consolidated Action provides that: "The
Parties expect that, by the date of the Fairness Hearing, SONY BMG will
have entered into an enforceable, nationwide agreement resolving one or
more of the Government Inquiries."' 55 But the fairness hearing has come
and gone and yet no settlement has been reached and the Texas action
continues to proceed. 
56
Sony has been able to resolve the litigation resulting from the root-
kit debacle rather quickly. But this is not the end of the story. The root-
kit debacle has disillusioned consumers, lawmakers, and artists alike.
Moreover, it has raised numerous legal questions that are sure to arise the
next time Sony or another record label releases copy-protected CDs.
III. LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SONY ROOTKIT DEBACLE
The Sony rootkit debacle has raised numerous legal issues, and this
section focuses on those at the heart of the controversy surrounding the
recording industry's use of digital rights management (DRM) to protect
its intellectual property. First, it analyzes Sony's potential liability for
manufacturing and distributing CDs containing MediaMax and XCP
software, including (i) whether it violated the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and the Texas Consumer Spyware Act of 2005,157 and (ii)
whether Sony's copy-prevention software comported with copyright law,
specifically the fair use doctrine. Second, this section examines the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, which prohibits the circumven-
tion of DRM technology, and the potential legal exposure created by that
statute for Sony customers and security researchers.
154. Compare Texas Petition, supra note 152, 7-13 and Sony Complaint, supra note 68,
1-4.
155. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, W.A.
156. Welcome to the Information Website, supra note 149; Sony BMG Settles Candian 'Root-
kit' Cases, supra note 143.
157. There are numerous state law claims that were or potentially could have been asserted
against Sony, such as trespass to chattels, unfair business practices, and fraud. See Sony Complaint,
supra note 68, 68-99 (alleging non-disclosure, deceptive acts and practices, false advertising,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, trespass to chattels, common law fraud,
and negligent misrepresentation); Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 99 90-114 (alleging material
misrepresentations and omissions of fact, unconscionability and unreasonableness, and computer
contamination in violation of California Penal Code § 502). Because evaluating every potential
cause of action against Sony is beyond the scope of this article, it focuses on the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, the only federal statute asserted against Sony, and the Texas Consumer Spyware
Act, the only law that a government agency has alleged was violated by Sony's conduct. Texas
Petition, supra note 152, 14-16; Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 9 58-67.
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A. Sony's Potential Liability158
1. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which was enacted in
1984, was the first comprehensive federal computer crime statute.' 59 The
CFAA outlaws seven types of conduct: (1) knowingly accessing a com-
puter without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, to obtain
national security information; 160 (2) intentionally accessing a computer
without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, to obtain informa-
tion; 16 1 (3) intentionally accessing without authorization a computer used
by the federal government;' 62 (4) knowingly accessing a "protected com-
puter" without authorization, or exceeding authorized access, with intent
to defraud;163 (5) intentionally accessing a "protected computer" without
authorization and causing damage; 164 (6) knowing fraudulent trafficking
of computer passwords; 165 and (7) transmitting communications that
threaten to damage a "protected computer" with intent to extort. 66
The CFAA is a criminal statute that also provides for a civil cause
of action.167 Pursuant to section 1030(g), a civil lawsuit can be brought if
(i) plaintiff suffered damage or loss due to a violation of the statute, and
(ii) the conduct at issue involved one of the five factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B).168  The first factor-"loss to 1 or more persons
during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecu-
tion, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting
from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected
computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value"-is the one that liti-
gants generally rely upon. 1
69
158. Sony likely would argue it was unaware of how the copy-prevention software operated,
and therefore, should not be held liable for any damage it may have caused. This article presumes
that Sony's attempt to make such an argument would fail.
159. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2006); Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act









168. Southwest Airlines v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("A
careful reading of the statute shows that a civil plaintiff is not required to state a cause of action
pursuant to subsection (a)(5), but merely to allege one of the factors enunciated in subsection
(a)(5)(B).").
169. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i). The other four factors are:
(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medi-
cal examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals; (iii) physical in-
jury to any person; (iv) a threat to public health or safety; or (v) damage affecting a com-
puter system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of




a. Is there a cause of action under § 1030(a)(5)(B)?
In the Consolidated Action, plaintiffs asserted that Sony violated
section 1030(a)(5)(B) of the CFAA by intentionally accessing customers'
computers without authorization and, as a result of such conduct, causing
damage-namely the "loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year
period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value."' 70 To prevail on this
claim, plaintiffs would have been faced with two potential stumbling
blocks: the $5,000 damage provision and the unauthorized access re-
quirement. 
1 7'
i. CFAA's $5,000 Damage Provision
Under section 1030(a)(B)(5) of the CFAA, plaintiffs must prove
"damage" or "loss" of at least $5,000.172 This is often an insurmountable
barrier to the individual computer user because "[e]ven the most expen-
sive personal computer costs much less than this."1 73 Moreover, it is not
clear what type of damage or loss is sufficient to meet the CFAA's
$5,000 requirement. Some courts have held that the damage or loss must
be related to investigating or remedying damage to a computer. 74 Others
have concluded that damage to reputation or goodwill counts toward the
damage threshold.17 5  "The question this raises for the individual con-
170. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, In 59-67.
171. The statute also provides that the defendant access a "protected computer," which is
limited to computers used by a financial institutions, the United States Government, or in interstate
commerce or communication. See § 1030(e)(2). In the past, this requirement posed an additional
hurdle because most computers were not used in these capacities. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Patterson,
Spyware Covertly Infringing on Your Internet Privacy While Circumventing the Federal Legislation
Radar, 54 DRAKE E. REv. 233, 249-50 (2005). However, ifa computer is connected to the Internet,
it more than likely is used in interstate commerce or communication. Although a significant number
of Americans still do not use the Internet, most of those people do not have a computer. See Jim
Downing, Americans Who Use the Internet, SMART MOBS, Oct. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.smartmobs.com/archive/2005/10/06/americans who u.html; Nearly 150 Million Adult
Americans Use the Internet, Survey Says, FOX.COM, Apr. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193417,00.html. Thus, while there may be some computers
that are not connected to the Internet and, therefore, would not meet the "protected computer" re-
quirement, they are a small minority. Downing, supra note 171; § 1030(e)(2). This is particularly
true with respect to those individuals harmed by the Sony rootkit, because the vast majority of peo-
ple who listen to music on their computers are also Internet users.
172. Whether a plaintiff claims "damages" or "losses" under the CFAA, courts have held that
plaintiff is subject to the $5,000 threshold. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp.
2d 497, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
173. Alan F. Blakley et al., Coddling Spies: Why the Law Doesn't Adequately Address Com-
puter Spyware, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 25, 33.
174. See, e.g., Nexans Wires S.A.. v. SARK-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (stating that costs unrelated to computer repair, such as travel costs for business that could
have been conducted by telephone, do not constitute "loss" within the meaning of the CFAA); Res-
Dev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, 6:04 cv_1374 Orl_3IDAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099, at *9-
12 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ("The CFAA's 'loss' definition ... list[s] costs that are similar in that they are
all directly associated with, or with addressing, an unauthorized-computer-access event.").
175. America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,451 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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sumer is whether litigation and the necessity of experts to show the ex-
tent of loss are worth the chance of recovery.'
176
Even where, as here, a class action has arisen, the damage provision
can still pose a problem because courts are divided on whether plaintiffs'
claims can be aggregated to meet the $5,000 minimum. 77 In Thurmond
v. Compaq Computer Corporation,178 the court held that aggregation is
not permitted under the CFAA because the statute requires damage to "a
protected computer," i.e., a single computer.179 The court explained that
"no one can bring a cause of action unless the defendant causes an ag-
gregate of $5,000 'damage' to a protected computer. If defendant causes
such damage, then any injured person may bring a claim even if, his or
her own 'damage,' is less than $5,000. ''180
In In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation,181 the court analyzed
the CFAA's legislative history and held that plaintiffs could only aggre-
gate damages and losses across victims and time for a single act by the
defendant. 182 In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the fact that
"damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of
data, a program, a system, or information."'183 That Congress used the
singular form of these words rather than the plural (i.e., programs, sys-
tems) indicates that the statute should apply only to single acts.
184
By contrast, in In re: America Online, Inc. (AOL), 185 the court held
that the $5,000 threshold applies to all computers that the defendant's
unlawful conduct affected. 86  The court specifically considered, and
rejected, the decisions in Thurmond and DoubleClick on the grounds that
they were not binding precedent, they misread the statute, and they mis-
interpreted the legislative history. 8 7  The court further explained that
interpreting the CFAA as Thurmond and DoubleClick courts did,
would lead to the absurd result that a party who accesses one com-
puter without authorization, and thereby causes $5,000 worth of
damage to that one computer, would be guilty of violating the CFAA
and, therefore, civilly liable. On the other hand, a party who accesses
176. Blakley et al., supra note 173, at 33.
177. Luke J. Albrecht, Online Marketing: The Use of Cookies & Remedies for Internet Users,
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 431-33 (2003).
178. 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
179. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
180. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
181. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
182. Double Click, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523-24.
183. § 1030(e)(8) (emphasis added).
184. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
185. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
186. In re America Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
187. The AOL court also distinguished these cases on another ground: "Moreover, their prece-
dent did not allow them to aggregate damages until the classes had been certified. In the Eleventh




millions of computers and causes only $100 worth of damage to each
computer would not be guilty of violating the CFAA.'
88
In light of this split among district courts, it is unclear to what ex-
tent plaintiffs may aggregate their damages in alleging a CFAA viola-
tion. Nevertheless, in a lawsuit against Sony for damage caused by its
copy-protection software, plaintiffs would be able to satisfy the $5,000
minimum regardless of whether the court applied the Thurmond, Dou-
bleClick, or AOL rule.
Under Thurmond, as long as plaintiffs can demonstrate that at least
one class member suffered $5,000 in "damage" or "loss" the threshold is
met. 1 89 This includes "any reasonable cost to any victim, including the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior
to the offense .. .190 Given the extreme difficulty customers experi-
enced trying to remove (or have someone else remove) the software from
their computer systems, it is highly likely that at least one individual
suffered $5,000 in damages.191
Plaintiffs also would have been able to demonstrate a "single act" as
required by the court in DoubleClick.1 92 As alleged in the complaint:
"SONY BMG's act of producing its master encoded tapes through which
DRM CDs were made, was a single act that proximately resulted in dam-
ages greater than $5,000. ' ' 193 At the very least, even if the production of
MediaMax CDs was separate from the production of XCP CDs, each of
these acts alone caused more than $5,000 in damage to Sony custom-
ers. 194 Thus, plaintiffs would have satisfied the DoubleClick test.
Finally, there is no doubt that plaintiffs easily would have met the
$5,000 damage threshold under AOL, which allows the aggregation of all
damage caused by defendants to any victim.1 95 Sony manufactured more
than 20 million CDs with MediaMax software, and more than 5 million
with XCP software.1 96 These CDs were installed on tens of thousands of
188. Id. at 1374.
189. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
190. § 1030(e)(1 1).
191. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 11. Section 1030(e)(1 1) also provides for the
recovery of consequential damages, including, but not limited to, lost revenue. § 1030(e)(l 1). How-
ever, section 1030(g) - the provision that grants plaintiffs the right to bring a civil action - says that
"[d]amages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsection (a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to
economic damages." Id. § 1030(g) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this provision to mean
that "compensatory damages for such conduct will be awarded only for economic harm." P.C.
Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 511 (3d Cir.
2005).
192. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
193. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 66.
194. See id.
195. In reAOL, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-74.
196. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 33, 44.
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computers throughout the United States, and damages far exceeded the
$5,000 minimum. 97
ii. CFAA's Unauthorized Access Provision
Section 1030(a)(5)(B) additionally requires plaintiffs to demonstrate
that defendant accessed a computer without authority. 198 More specifi-
cally, the subsection of the CFAA asserted against Sony provides that
"[w]hoever ... intentionally accesses a protected computer without au-
thorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and ... by
[such] conduct.., caused... loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-
year period... aggregating at least $5,000 in value. . . shall be punished
... ,,199 In other words, the applicability of the CFAA depends on
whether the owner of the CD consented to the installation of the Media-
Max and/or XCP software on his computer.2 00
In cases like this one involving the installation of software, the
question of consent generally turns on the End User License Agreement
(EULA). A EULA is an agreement "between a producer and a user of
computer software, which grants the user a software license. ' '20' The
EULA is usually presented to the user electronically, and installation of
the software is conditioned upon the user accepting the EULA.2 °2 These
types of agreements are often referred to as "shrinkwrap licenses."
20 3
The use of EULAs in connection with computer software has been
the subject of great debate. Because EULAs are lengthy, contain overly
restrictive, non-negotiable terms, and frequently are not read by users,
many commentators have criticized the use of these agreements.2z 4 In
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation,20 5 the Second Circuit
held that a EULA was unenforceable because "a consumer's clicking on
197. See id. 60, 66.
198. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
199. § 1030(a)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also asserted claims under § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i)
("[w]hoever... knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command,
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected
computer") and § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) ("[wihoever ... intentionally accesses a protected computer
without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage"). Sony Complaint,
supra note 68, 59(b), (c). For present purposes, however, it is only necessary to analyze subsection
(iii) since that burden is the lowest for plaintiffs to overcome.
200. See Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1545, 1565 (2006) ("[Tjhe fact that the
CFAA only penalized 'unauthorized' computer access presupposes that any consent or authorization
which has been given to the accessing entity will create a defense to liability under the CFAA.").
201. Wikipedia, Software License Agreement (2006),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/softwarelicenseagreement.
202. Id.
203. F. Lawrence Street & Mark P. Grant, The Law of the Internet, § 103[1] (Brian Elias et al.
eds., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., Release No. 9 2005) (1997).
204. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cy-
bercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1562-63 (2005); see also Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I
Shrink- Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink- Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO
L. REv. 319 (1999); Barnes, supra note 200, at 1547.
205. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
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a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if
the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the
download button would signify assent to those terms. 20 6
By contrast, other courts have upheld these agreements regardless
of how unfair they may seem. In i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service
207Level Corporation,° for example, the court held that clicking on the "I
Agree" box was sufficient consent to form a contract.20 8 Similarly, in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,2 °9 the Seventh Circuit held that shrinkwrap
licenses are enforceable because, in many common transactions, con-
tracts are considered valid even though the consumer purchases the
product before being presented with the detailed terms of the contract.210
Here, the question whether acceptance of Sony's EULA provides
the necessary "consent" or "authorization" under the CFAA depends not
only on the terms of the EULA, but also on the manner in which the anti-
copying software was installed and how it operated. Although the terms
of the MediaMax and XCP EULA were essentially identical, as de-
scribed above, there were differences in the installation and operation of
the two software programs. Accordingly, MediaMax and XCP must be
analyzed separately under the CFAA.
a.) MediaMax Was Installed "Without Authorization"
MediaMax attempted to protect the content on the CD from being
ripped and copied while the EULA was being displayed by immediately
installing, and at least temporarily activating, the anti-copying soft-
ware.211 In other words, the MediaMax software was installed before the
user accepted the EULA and, thus, "without authorization. 212  Even if
the user ultimately rejected the EULA, the software remained on his
computer, and, in some cases, remained permanently active.23
The facts of this case are far more egregious than in Specht v. Net-
scape214 where the court determined there was no informed consent be-
206. Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30; see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d
91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991); SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1088 (C.D.
Cal. 2001); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993);
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998).
207. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass 2002).
208. i.Lan, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338; see also M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Co.,
998 P.2d 305, 311-14 (Wash. 2000); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
209. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
210. ProCD, 83 F.3d at 1452; see also Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
387 F.3d 522, 563 n.10 (6th Cir. 2004); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir.
1997); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Construction Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D.
Cal. 2006).
211. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.; Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
212. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.; Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
213. Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at 7.
214. Specht, 306 F.3d at 21-25.
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cause the EULA did not make clear that clicking on the download button
constituted acceptance of the contract. 2 5  Here, the user did not even
have a chance to view the EULA, much less accept it, before the soft-
ware was installed.21 6 Thus, this case is similar to Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc.217 and Sofiman Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.
218
In Register.com, the plaintiff was a registrar of domain names,
meaning it issued domain names to persons and entities preparing to es-
tablish web sites on the Internet.2 19 In applying for a domain name appli-
cants were required to submit certain information to Register.com ("Reg-
ister"), including name, address, telephone number, and email address. 2
This identifying information was referred to as "WHOIS information."
2 21
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a private non-profit corporation established by U.S. govern-
ment agencies to administer domain names, requires companies like Reg-
ister to update the WHOIS information daily and to make such informa-
tion publicly available. 222 An entity submitting a "WHOIS query" to
Register would receive the requested information together with the fol-
lowing message: "By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you
will use this data only for lawful purposes and that under no circum-
stances will you use this data to support the transmission of mass unso-
licited, commercial advertising or solicitation via email.
2 23
The defendant, Verio, Inc. ("Verio"), sells web site design, devel-
opment, and operation services.224 In order to attract customers, Verio
obtained daily updates from the WHOIS information, and then sent those
individuals marketing information by email, telemarketing, and direct
mail.225 As noted above, the terms and conditions that were included in
Register's query responses prohibited the use of WHOIS information to
solicit by email.226 Accordingly, Register sued Verio for violation of the
CFAA and trespass to chattels.2 27
In defense Verio argued that it was not bound by Register's terms
and conditions "because, in the case of each query Verio made, the
[terms and conditions] did not appear until after Verio had submitted the
215. Id. at 29-30.
216. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, I.G.
217. 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
218. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).




223. Id. at 397.
224. Id. at 396.
225. Id. at 396-97.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 397.
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query and received the WHOIS data. 228  In other words, Verio con-
tended it never received legally enforceable notice of Register's terms
and conditions. 229 Although the court ultimately rejected this argument,
before doing so it explained: "If Verio had submitted only one query, or
even if it had submitted only a few sporadic queries, that would give
considerable force to its contention that it obtained the WHOIS data
without being conscious that Register intended to impose conditions, and
without being deemed to have accepted Register's conditions., 230 Along
those same lines, the dissenting judge concluded:
By the time Register.com presents its proposed terms, it has already
given away that which it "owns" - access to its WHOIS database...
Thus, in the single submission scenario, an end-user would have
had no opportunity to reject Register.com's terms and would be
bound to comply with them irrespective of actual assent .... [Tihe
submission of a WHOIS query prior to the presentation of Regis-
ter.com's proposed terms [is] insufficient to constitute a manifesta-
tion of assent.
23 1
Register.com, therefore, stands for the proposition that a party cannot
assent to a contract before having the opportunity to review the terms and
conditions of that contract.
232
Similarly, in Sofiman Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,233Adobe
Systems Inc. ("Adobe"), a developer and publisher of software, sued
SoftMan Products Co. ("SoftMan"), a company that distributed computer
software programs through its website www.buycheapsoftware.com,
claiming that SoftMan was infringing Abode's copyright and trademark
as well as violating terms of its license by distributing Adobe's software
234in an unauthorized manner. There was no direct contractual relation-
ship between Adobe and SoftMan, instead, Adobe claimed that Soft-
Man's distribution of the software violated the EULA that end-users are
asked to assent to when they attempt to install Adobe software.235
Among other things, SoftMan contended that it was not bound by
the terms of the EULA because it never assented to that agreement.236
The court agreed with SoftMan, holding that
there is only assent on the part of the consumer, if at all, when the
consumer loads the Adobe program and begins the installation proc-
ess. It is undisputed that SoftMan has never attempted to load the
228. Id. at 401.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 431 (Parker, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 430-31 & n.43 (Parker, J., dissenting).
233. SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075.
234. Id. at 1079-80.
235. Id. at 1080.
236. Id. at 1087.
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software that it sells. Consequently, the Court finds that SoftMan is
not subject to the Adobe EULA.23 7
The holdings of Register.com and SofiMan make clear that Sony
had no right to install the MediaMax software before the end-user even
had an opportunity to view the EULA's terms and conditions. As such,
Sony accessed its customers' computers without authority in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
b.) XCP Was Not Installed "Without Authorization"
The XCP software used a different tool to prevent ripping and copy-
ing during the installation process. As described in greater detail above,
it searched for "blacklisted" ripping and copying applications, and pre-
cluded users who were running such applications from downloading the
software and listening to the music on the CD. Consequently, the XCP
software was not installed onto a user's computer until the EULA was
accepted.
Nor did the XCP EULA suffer from the defects identified in Specht
v. Netscape.238 The XCP EULA stated:
This End-User License Agreement ("EULA") is a legal agreement
between you and SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT
("SONY BMG"), a general partnership established under Delaware
law. By clicking on the "AGREE" button below, you will indicate
your acceptance of these terms and conditions, at which point this
EULA will become a legally binding agreement between you and
SONY BMG.
239
Because the EULA made clear that the user was assenting to the terms
the rationale of Netscape does not apply.
Moreover, while it is true that the XCP EULAs did not fully dis-
close the nature of the software being installed,24° that alone is not
enough to prove that Sony accessed the computers "without authoriza-
tion." The decision in In re. America Online241 is instructive on this
point.242 There, computer users sued AOL under section 1030(a)(5) of
the CFAA (the same provision asserted against Sony) claiming that AOL
5.0, a software program that had been recently released, damaged com-
puters and prohibited utilization of competitors' software.243 AOL
moved to dismiss this claim on the grounds that its access was not "with-
237. Id.
238. Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30.
239. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 28.
240. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the details of the MediaMax and XCP EULAs and soft-
ware features).
241. In reAOL, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359.
242. Id. at 1359.
243. Id. at 1363-64.
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out authorization" since "the consumers expressly authorized installation
of AOL 5.0 on their computers.",244 At most, AOL argued "it exceeded
the scope of its authority by distributing defective software, but exceed-
ing the scope of authorization is not a situation that is covered by 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the only provision under which the consumers have
brought suit.
245
After examining the plain language of the statute, the court agreed
with AOL.24 6  Section 1030(a)(5) requires that the access be "without
authorization"; it says nothing about the access "exceeding authoriza-
tion.,, 24 7 By contrast, several provisions of the CFAA - namely, sections
1030(a)(1), 248 (2),249 and (4),250 - specifically state that a violation occurs
if defendant accesses a computer without authorization or if it exceeds
authorized access. 25 ' The CFAA further provides that "exceeds author-
ized access" means "to access a computer with authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the acces-
sor is not entitled to so obtain or alter., 252 Hence, the AOL court decided
Congress clearly intended to distinguish between "without authorization"
and "exceeds authorized access. 253
If Congress wanted section 1030(a)(5) to apply to defendants who
exceed authorized access it would have included that term within the
scope of section 1030(a)(5) as it did with the other subsections of
1030(a). "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion., 254 Thus, even though Sony and/or F4i may have
"exceeded authorized access" by installing XCP software on customers'
computers, the plain language of the statute and the cases interpreting it
would likely preclude plaintiffs from recovering under section 1030(a)(5)
of the CFAA.255
244. Id. at 1368.
245. Id. at 1368-69.
246. Id. at 1369-70.
247. § 1030(a)(5).
248. § 1030(a)(1) ("having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access ....") (emphasis added).
249. § 1030(a)(2) ("intentionally access a computer without authorization or exceeds author-
ized access .. ") (emphasis added).
250. § 1030(a)(4) ("knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer with-
out authorization, or exceeds authorized access ....") (emphasis added).
251. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4).
252. § 1030(e)(6).
253. In reAOL, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1369-70.
254. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) (quoting Russello v. United
States 464 U.S. 16 (1983)).
255. See Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The differ-
ence between 'without authorization' and 'exceeding authorized access' is paper thin, but not quite
invisible." (citations omitted)).
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b. Is there a cause of action under other provisions of the
CFAA?
Although the CFAA claims asserted against Sony in the Consoli-
dated Action relied solely upon section 1030(a)(5)(B), Sony may also
have violated other provisions of the CFAA. Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C),
for example, prohibits intentionally accessing a computer without au-
thorization, or exceeding authorized access, to obtain "information from
any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign
communication."
256
The MediaMax and XCP EULA stated that "the SOFTWARE will
not be used at any time to collect any personal information from you,
whether stored on YOUR COMPUTER or otherwise. 257 Yet, in truth,
both MediaMax and XCP contained "phone home" capabilities, meaning
these software programs gathered information from users' computers,
including IP addresses and the title of the CD being played on the user's
computer, and communicated that information back to Sony.258 Under
these circumstances, even if customers accepted the EULA, they clearly
did not consent to Sony's use of the software to collect personal informa-
tion. Accordingly, Sony was accessing its customers' computers without
authorization or, at the very least, exceeding authorized access.
Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) also requires the "conduct," i.e., the act of
"accessing a computer," to involve an interstate or foreign communica-
tion.259 Here, Sony accessed its customers' computers with software that
was included on CDs, which are products sold in interstate commerce,
and then used that software to communicate information from the cus-
tomer's computer back to Sony and/or the software manufacturer. 6 °
Such conduct plainly involves interstate communications, and, therefore,
this requirement is satisfied. Hence, a cause of action should lie pursuant
to section 1030(a)(2)(C).
Nevertheless, a question remains as to who can bring a lawsuit un-
der section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA. While the government undoubt-
edly could bring a criminal action under this provision of the CFAA, it is
not as clear whether a civil claim could be asserted as well. Section
1030(g) of the CFAA provides for a civil lawsuit where (i) the plaintiff
suffered damage or loss due to a violation of the statute, and (ii) the con-
256. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
257. Sony EULA, http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/sony-eula.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
258. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 27.
259. § 1030(a)(2)(C). See C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Command Transp., LLC, No. 05
C 3401, 2005 WL 3077998, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2005); Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, No. 04
C 7071, 2005 WL 2369815, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005).
260. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 30, 64.
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duct at issue involved one of the five factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(5)(B). 26 1
Many litigants, including plaintiffs in the Consolidated Action, ap-
parently interpret this language to mean that a civil action under the
CFAA can only be brought under section 1030(a)(5)(B).262 And, in fact,
at least one court has come to the same conclusion.263 In recent years,
however, several courts have considered the issue and now the weight of
authority leans heavily in the other direction.
In P.C. Yonkers v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore,264
for example, the court held that a civil action could be stated under any
provision of the CFAA as long as the plaintiff alleges one of the five
factors enumerated in subsection (a)(5)(B), which includes a loss in ex-
cess of $5,000.265 Moreover, in LM.S. Inquiry Management Systems,
Ltd. v. Berkshire Information Systems, Inc. ,266 the defendant argued that
plaintiff could not state a claim under section 1030(a)(2)(C) on the
grounds that section 1030(g) does not provide a civil cause of action for
violations of this subsection.267 The court rejected this argument, finding
that:
The plain text of § 1030(g) does not provide or imply, and defendant
offers no supporting case law for, such a restriction. Section 1030(g)
affords a civil action for any CFAA violation, but requires an allega-
tion of one of five enumerated factors in § 1030(a)(5)(B). Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint satisfies § 1030(g) by elsewhere alleging the
consequence described in § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (loss aggregating to at
least $5,000).268
Like the defendant in LMS.,269 (i) Sony exceeded authority in ac-
cessing its customers' computers, (ii) it obtained information from its
customers by such conduct, (iii) that conduct involved interstate commu-
nications, and (iv) as a result of such conduct, Sony caused at least
$5,000 in loss or damage to its customers. Consequently, Sony, too,
would be subject to civil suit under section 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA
for its conduct with respect to both the MediaMax and XCP software.
261. § 1030(g).
262. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, M 59, 62.
263. McLean v. Mortgage One & Fin. Corp., No. 04-1158, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7279, at *5
(D. Minn. Apr. 9, 2004) (holding that section 1030(g)'s reference to subsection (a)(5)(B) limits civil
relief to claims under subsection (a)(5)(B)).
264. 428 F.3d 504 (3d Cir. 2005).
265. Yonkers, 428 F.3d at 512.
266. 307 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
267. LM.S., 307 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26.
268. Id at 526.
269. Other courts similarly have determined that a civil cause of action lies under §
1030(a)(2)(C). See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 986 (9th Cir. 2003); Chance v.
Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1272, 1279-80 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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2. Texas Spyware Act
Spyware is software that is covertly installed onto a computer, for
example by bundling it with other software that the user downloads.27 °
Once installed, spyware transmits information from the user's computer
to the servers of the entity responsible for installing the spyware.27'
"Spyware can monitor everything users do with their machines, not only
their activities on the web, and transmit that information to an outside
i,272entity. The use of spyware has grown dramatically in recent years.
In fact, one study shows that more than 80% of personal computers in the
United States are infected by spyware, although most users are unaware
of it.
273
Consequently, federal and state legislators have been working to
enact laws to address this very serious threat. In 2005, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed two spyware-related bills: (1) the Securely Pro-
tect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act,27 4 and (2) the Internet Spy-
ware (I-Spy) Prevention Act of 2005.275 The Senate also is considering a
spyware bill called the Spy Block Act,276 which was approved by the
Senate Commerce Committee in 2005, but was not voted on by the full
Senate.27 7 To date, however, no further action has been taken by Con-
gress on any of these bills. According to one commentator, Congress
may be revising the bills "in view of issues raised late in 2005 by Sony's
Rootkit copy-protection software and the associated end-user-license-
agreement. 27 8
In the absence of federal legislation, some states, including Texas,
have taken it upon themselves to outlaw spyware.2 79 The Texas Con-
sumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act ("Texas Spyware
Act"), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 48.001 et seq., came into effect on Sep-
tember 1, 2005.280 Generally, the statute prohibits the following conduct:
(1) unauthorized collection or culling of personally identifiable informa-
270. Laurel L. Poe, Comment, The SPY Act: A Bandage for an Ever-Festering Sore or an
Efficient Safeguard for the American Consumer?, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 329, 331 (2005).
271. Id. at 335.
272. Blakley, supra note 173, at 28. See also Erica Pines, Note, Spyware Regulation: National
Legislation Should Prompt Industry Self-Policing, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 2219, 2219 (2005) ("Spy-
ware can change individual computer settings, track personal information numbers, store credit card
numbers, and access all personal data stored on a computer's hard drive, thereby shredding away
every bit of privacy personal computer users think they have.").
273. Poe, supra note 270, at 329-30.
274. H.R. 29, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
275. H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
276. S. 687, 109th Cong. § 1(a) (2005).
277. Britt L. Anderson, Is Anti-Spyware Legislation Congress's Killer App in 2006?, 4 No. 2
INTERNET L. & STRATEGY 1,4 (Feb. 2006).
278. Id.
279. Michael L. Baroni, Spyware Beware, 47 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 36, 38 (Apr. 2005)
(stating that Utah and California have also enacted spyware-related laws).
280. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.001 (West 2006).
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tion; 28s (2) unauthorized access to or modifications of computer set-
tings; 282 (3) unauthorized interference with installation or disabling of
computer software; 283 (4) inducement of computer user to install unnec-
essary software; 284 and (5) copying and execution of software to a com-
puter with deceptive intent. 285 The Texas Spyware Act also provides for
a civil right of action, which applies to users of personal and business
computers, and permits private parties to obtain damages of $100,000 for
each violation.286
On November 21, 2005, the Texas Attorney General sued Sony for
violation of the Texas Spyware Act - the first lawsuit under the new
statute.287 Specifically, Texas asserts that, by marketing, distributing,
and selling CDs with XCP software, Sony has violated section 48.053 of
the Texas Spyware Act.288 That section, which concerns the unauthor-
ized interference with installation or disabling of computer software,
provides:
If a person is not the owner or operator of the computer, the person
may not knowingly cause computer software to be copied to a com-
puter in this state and use the software to:
(1) prevent, through intentionally deceptive means, reasonable efforts
of the owner or operator of the computer to block the installation or
execution of or to disable computer software by causing computer
software that the owner or operator has properly removed or disabled
to automatically reinstall or reactivate on the computer;
(2) intentionally misrepresent to another that computer software will
be uninstalled or disabled by the actions of the owner or operator of
the computer;
(3) remove, disable, or render inoperative, through intentionally de-
ceptive means, security, antispyware, or antivirus computer software
installed on the computer;
(4) prevent the owner's or operator's reasonable efforts to block the






286. § 48.10 1(a), (b)(2)(B).
287. Texas Petition, supra note 152, 2; Texas Sues Sony BMGfor Spyware, supra note 152,
at 3 1; News Release, Attorney General Abbott Brings First Enforcement Action in Nation Against
Sony BMG for Spyware Violations (Nov. 21, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/
oagNews/release.php?id=1266.
288. Texas Petition, supra note 152, 14-16. Unlike the civil lawsuits discussed above, this
case involves XCP only, not MediaMax. Texas Petition, supra note 152, 7.
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(A) presenting the owner or operator with an option to decline the in-
stallation of software knowing that, when the option is selected, the
installation process will continue to proceed; or
(B) misrepresenting that software has been disabled;
(5) change the name, location, or other designation of computer soft-
ware to prevent the owner from locating and removing the software;
or
(6) create randomized or intentionally deceptive file names or ran-
dom or intentionally deceptive directory folders, formats, or registry
entries to avoid detection and prevent the owner from removing
computer software.
289
Of particular importance to the case against Sony are the last two
clauses. Subsection (5) prohibits a person from changing the name or
location of software to prevent the computer user from finding and re-
moving the software.290 Similarly, subsection (6) prohibits the creation
of randomized or deceptive file names or folders to prevent removal of
the software.2 9 ' As discussed above, this is exactly what the rootkit in-
stalled by the XCP did: it concealed all files that began with "$sys$,"
including the copy-prevention software, so that the files could not be
located and removed. Indeed, Thomas Hesse, President of Sony's
Global Digital Business, admitted this during his NPR interview when he
explained that the software was cloaked "so would be pirates can't find it
and remove it."' 29 2 It thus appears, based on the plain language of the
statute, that Sony violated the Texas Spyware Law.293
3. Does Sony's Copy-Prevention Software Violate Copyright Law?
Most people were outraged by the Sony rootkit incident because the
software created security risks to and collected information from the
user's computer, not because Sony was limiting the number of copies of
the CD the customer could make. Allegations that Sony was using spy-
ware and causing serious damage to customers' computers overshad-
owed the question whether Sony's copy-protection software impinged on
customers' rights under copyright law, in particular the fair use doctrine.
However, this is an important question to examine given Sony and the
289. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.053 (West 2006).
290. § 48.053(5).
291. § 48.053(6).
292. NPR Interview, supra note 129.
293. It is important to note, however, that the Texas Spyware Act has never been "tested" in
the courts, and therefore, Sony could assert certain defenses to invalidate the statute. In particular,
Sony may argue that the Texas Spyware Act is unconstitutional because it violates the dormant
commerce clause, which limits states' authority to enact laws that unduly burden interstate com-
merce. Cf Pines, supra note 272, at 2230-39 (analyzing California's spyware act and concluding that
it violates the dormant commerce clause).
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other record labels are certain to continue to use DRM technology to
copy-protect CDs.
294
a. Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright law grants copyright owners the exclusive right to
copy and distribute copyrighted works.295 "Fair use" is an excep-
tion to this exclusive right that allows copying for certain limited
purposes, including commenting on, criticizing, reporting about, or
parodying a copyrighted work.296 It is the fair use doctrine, for example,
that allows a book critic to quote from the novel she is reviewing without
obtaining permission from the copyright owner.297 Thus, fair use pro-
tects the public interest in a free exchange of ideas and discourse.298
Fair use is a deliberately imprecise and flexible doctrine. It "per-
mits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright stat-
ute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law
is designed to foster., 299  There are no bright line rules for deciding
whether certain conduct constitutes fair use.3 °° Instead, courts make that
decision on a case-by-case basis by considering at least the following
four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
294. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, IV.B (setting forth guidelines that Sony must
follow in the future when developing DRM technology). As an RIAA Spokesperson recently ex-
plained:
DRM and copy protection are important parts of the creative process, serving to protect
the work of musicians and labels and promote responsible personal use by fans. They are
no silver bullet, nor were they ever intended to be. They are one component of a larger
effort to protect our works from theft .... DRM is a key piece of the digital future, not
just for music companies but also for movie studios, software companies and countless
other intellectual property industries.)
Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies' Next Flop?, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://forum.ecoustics.com/bbs/messages/34579/192800.html; Richard Gooch, Setting the Record
Straight on DRM, Feb. 3, 2006, http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20060203.htn-l ("DRM is the
key to our successful digital music business. It enables consumers to get exactly what they pay for,
and to pay for exactly for what they get. But to work in the future DRM will need support from our
technology partners and from governments.").
295. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(l), (3) (West 2006).
296. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
297. See id.
298. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (stating that the fair
use doctrine is necessary "to fulfill copyright's very purpose, 'to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts').
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and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
30 1
Because fair use has been left ambiguous so it can evolve over time,
the doctrine is often misunderstood. By way of example, many people
believe that "personal" or non-commercial use (e.g., copying lawfully
acquired copyrighted materials for one's personal use) is always fair
use.302 This is not true.303 While courts have found that the fair use doc-
trine protects certain personal uses of copyrighted materials, there is no
304blanket statutory or common law rule protecting this behavior.
The most well-known case addressing the question whether per-
sonal use falls within the fair use exception is Sony Corporation ofAmer-
ica v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 305 In that case, Universal and other
copyright owners sued Sony for copyright infringement based on its
manufacture of the video cassette recorder ("VCR"), a novel product at
the time.30 6 Plaintiffs argued that Sony should be held liable because it
knew or should have known that its customers would engage in infring-
301. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
302. See Fair Use, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairuse
(last modified Sep. 1, 2006) (discussing the doctrine of fair use in the United States). See also The
Big Picture, DRM Crippled CD: A Bizarre Tale in 4 Parts, Oct. 31, 2005, http://bigpicture.
typepad.com/comments/2005/10/drm-crippledcd.html. As one music fan explained their under-
standing of fair use:
I am a buyer of CDs, and only rarelydo [sic] I download tracks from Apple's iTunes Mu-
sic Store due to sound quality. I didn't spend an obscene amount of money on a home au-
dio system to listen to the mediocre audio quality of MP3s. The not-even-remotely-as-
lossless-as-advertised-compression algorithms are hardly any better. MP3s and iPod
quality music is fine for the beach or my commute on a train, but its something else en-
tirely in my living room. My fair use: When I get a new CD, I rip it to iTunes, then trans-
fer the music to my iPods; I make a backup copy (in case of loss). If I really like a disc, I
make a copy for the car or the weekend house. If the disc is 'youth-friendly,' I'll make a
copy for my wife's classroom. She teaches art, and I refuse to let her take any more
original discs to school-they have all gotten destroyed. Incidentally, I am what the
marketing people like to call an 'influencer' (i.e., think ofNetflix, TiVo or Macintosh). I
do not copy entire CDs for people, but I like to expose friends to news [sic] music-I will
give them a song or two, with the recommendation that if they like it, they purchase the
artist's disc. I use P2P to check out stuff not available elsewhere, or to see if I want to
purchase a full CD. I also like to make mixed playlists, which get burned for the car or
for friends who are looking to hear new music, now that radio is dead. I believe all of the
above is well within my rights as a consumer of the CDs that I legally purchased; If
someone wants to try to convince me otherwise, please take your best shot.
Id.
Even worse, some people apparently believe that it is fair use to let your friends make pirated copies
of CD's. See id ("[P]irating the album is the [sic] now the sole *best* way to get this album, be-
cause you can get a 100% compatible, full quality copy that you can't even buy in the store.").
303. See JOINT REPLY COMMENTS OF AAP: ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, ET AL.,
EXEMPTION TO PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR
ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES, at 39 (2006) [hereinafter JOINT REPLY], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/ ImetalitzAAP.pdf.
304. See id. at 31-33, 39.
305. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
306. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 420.
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ing activity, i.e., the taping of copyrighted television programs and
films.3 07
At trial, however, the evidence demonstrated that Sony's customers
used their VCRs primarily to "time-shift," i.e., to tape a program so that
it could be viewed at a later, more convenient time, which the Court de-
termined was a non-infringing fair use.30 8 The evidence further showed
that Sony did not manufacture the VCR explicitly to encourage or cause
its customers to tape copyrighted programs, nor did Sony take active
steps to increase its profits from illegal taping.30 9 Thus, there was no
basis to hold Sony liable for inducement of infringement, and the only
theory available to plaintiffs was contributory infringement. 3'0  The
Court went on to hold that, because the VCR is "capable of commer-
cially significant noninfringing use" (i.e., time-shifting programs), Sony
could not be held liable for infringement based solely on distribution of
the product.31'
Another important case regarding "personal use" of copyrighted
materials is Recording Industry Association ofAmerica v. Diamond Mul-
timedia Systems, Inc.312 There, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) sought a preliminary injunction against the manufac-
turer of the Rio, a portable MP3 player, on the grounds that the Rio did
not meet the requirements for digital audio recording devices under the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).313 AHRA "prohibits legal
actions for copyright infringement based on the manufacture, importa-
tion, or distribution of digital audio equipment or media for private, non-
commercial recording., 314 AHRA also prohibits infringement actions
against the consumers of these products as long as they are being used
for a noncommercial purpose.315
In return, AHRA requires manufacturers of these products to pay
compensatory royalties to copyright holders,316 and mandates that all
such products include a Serial Copy Management System ("SCMS").
3 17
The SCMS "sends, receives, and acts upon information about the genera-
tion and copyright status of the files that it plays.' 3 18 More specifically,
the SCMS prevents digital audio equipment from making a chain of high
307. Id.
308. Id. at 423, 425.
309. Id. at 438.
310. Id. at 439-40.
311. Id. at 442.
312. 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
313. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1075.
314. Yu, supra note 13, at 706; see also Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording
Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 380 (2003).
315. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1008 (West 2006).
316. § 1003(a).
317. § 1002(a).
318. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1075.
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quality digital copies; in other words, the user can make as many copies
of an original recording as he wishes, but cannot make copies of cop-
ies.
3 19
The district court agreed that the Rio failed to comply with the
AHRA because it did not include the SCMS, but denied RIAA's request
for a preliminary injunction.32 ° On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the
lower court erred in finding that the Rio was covered by AHRA because,
in order to be a "digital audio recording device," the Rio must be able to
reproduce a "digital music recording" either "directly" or "from a trans-
mission.', 32 1 The court further found that computer hard drives are not
digital audio recording devices subject to the AHRA.322
Relying on Sony Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. ,323 the court then went on to hold that, under the fair use doctrine, the
Rio was not an infringing device.324 "The Rio merely makes copies in
order to render portable, or "space-shift," those files that already reside
on a user's hard drive. Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial
personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the [Copyright]
Act.1
3 25
In sum, there is no bright-line test for determining what constitutes
fair use, nor is there a blanket rule that all personal use is fair. But on a
case-by-case basis, courts have decided that certain personal uses, in-
cluding time-shifting and space-shifting, constitute fair and non-
infringing use.
b. Did Sony's Copy-Prevention Software Allow Fair Use?
Up to this point, the DRM used by record labels has been "largely
skewed in favor of the content owner at the expense of the consumer.,
326
Critics have called these systems "too draconian" because of the limita-
tions they place on consumers' ability to play music. 327 In other words,
the recording industry has "los[t] sight of the fact that 'both ... [the
copyright owner and the consumer] have rights that need to be pro-
tected. '"9328
With its copy-prevention software, Sony was attempting to strike
this balance between protecting its intellectual property and allowing
319. Yu, supra note 13, at 707.
320. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1081.
321. Id. at 1081; See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1001(1), (3).
322. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1078.
323. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
324. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079.
325. Id. (citation omitted).
326. Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies' Next Flop?, supra note 294.
327. Id.
328. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Kendall Whitehouse, Senior Director of Ad-
vanced Technology Development at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania).
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"responsible personal use by fans., 329 Generally, the software allowed a
consumer to do the following with his purchased music: (i) save one
copy of the CD on his hard drive; (ii) play the CD on his computer using
certain media players; (iii) download the CD to certain portable devices;
and (iv) burn three backup copies of the CD.33° In addition, the Media-
Max software allowed consumers to email tracks to friends who could
listen to them for ten days.33' Thus, the copy-prevention software was
intended to allow users to space-shift their music for personal use (i.e.,
listen to it on a computer, CD, or portable player), and to share music
with friends, but not "'giv[e] it away forever.'
' 332
While this may have been Sony's intention, it was not the reality.
The content on the copy-protected CDs could only be transferred to cer-
tain media players and portable devices (i.e., those using Sony or Micro-
soft products), and could not be transferred to an iPod device or iTunes
media player.333 Given that the iPod is the dominant portable device and
that iTunes is one of the most popular media players,334 many purchasers
of Sony's copy-protected CDs were denied the right to "space-shift" their
music.
As discussed above, in Recording Industry Association of America
v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., the court specifically held that
space-shifting legally purchased music to a portable MP3 player is per-
mitted under the fair use doctrine.335 It is true that "there is no unquali-
fied right to access works on any particular machine or device of the
329. Id.
330. The exact parameters of what activity was prohibited by the software were spelled out in
the EULA. It said:
This CD contains technology that is designed to prevent users from making certain, unau-
thorized uses of the DIGITAL CONTENT, including, without limitation, the following:
(1) making and storing more that one (1) copy of the DIGITAL CONTENT in each
available file format on the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER; (2) accessing the
DIGITAL CONTENT on YOUR COMPUTER (once you have installed a copy of it on
the hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER) using a media player that is not an APPROVED
MEDIA PLAYER; (3) transferring copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT that reside on the
hard drive of YOUR COMPUTER on to portable devices that are not APPROVED
PORTABLE DEVICES; (4) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL
CONTENT stored on YOUR COMPUTER (ATRAC OpenMG file format only) onto
AtracCDs; (5) burning more than three (3) copies of the DIGITAL CONTENT onto re-
cordable compact discs in the so-called "Red Book"-compliant audio file format; and (6)
burning more than three (3) backup copies of this CD (using the burning application pro-
vided on the CD) onto recordable CDs and burning or otherwise making additional cop-
ies form the resulting backup copies.
Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, Ex. B.
33 I. Snider, supra note 70; Halderman, supra note 65, at 6.
332. Snider, supra note 70 (quoting William Whitmore of SunnComm).
333. Sony Complaint, supra note 68, 2, 24.
334. Id. 24; Daniel Greenberg, Chasing Apple's Dominant iPod, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004,
at F06; WebSiteOptimization.com, Apple's iTunes Player Climbs Streaming Media Charts, Mar. 15,
2006, http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0603/.
335. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079.
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user's choosing. 336 However, as Dr. Richard Gooch, the Deputy Direc-
tor of Technology for IFPI,337 recently said: "[u]sers should be free to
select among a wide range of devices and services from different suppli-
ers while being safe in the knowledge that these will work properly to-
gether. ,
338
Here, users were denied the right to choose from a wide variety of
devices and were instead forced to listen to their copy-protected CDs on
a portable device that was compatible with Sony or Microsoft products.
For the significant number of customers whose portable device was an
iPod, this meant they either had to go out and spend a few hundred dol-
lars to purchase a new MP3 player or they had to accept that the content
on their copy-protected CD could not be space-shifted. 339 This was not
an acceptable choice. Accordingly, Sony went too far in attempting to
protect its copyrighted works, and as a result, impinged on its customers'
right to fair use.
B. Potential Liability Under DMCA
Another issue raised by the Sony rootkit debacle concerns the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA),340 a federal statute that
broadly prohibits the circumvention of DRM technology.34' More spe-
cifically, the question is whether (i) Sony customers who attempted to
remove the copy-protection software from their computers, and (ii) indi-
viduals who provided information as to how to remove the copy-
protection software to the public, are potentially liable under the DMCA.
1. The Background of the DMCA
In December, 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) held a conference in Geneva, which led to the adoption of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty.342 "[T]he WIPO Copyright Treaty was created
336. JOINT REPLY, supra note 303, at 34 (quoting the 2000 recommendations of the Register of
Copyrights, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556, 64569 (Oct. 27, 2000)).
337. The IFPI is the International Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers.
338. Gooch, supra note 294.
339. Cf JOINT REPLY, supra note 303, at 34 (arguing that the fact that DVDs cannot be played
on Linux operating systems is not a violation of fair use because "[c]opyright owners have never
been legally required to enable access to their products from a multiplicity of platforms . .. . Over
eighty million U.S. households now own a DVD player. DVD players can be purchased for less
than fifty dollars and portable DVD players can be purchased for less than one hundred dollars.").
The media companies are arguing that they should not have to make DVDs compatible with Linux
systems because (i) most people do not have a Linux operated computer, and (ii) most people have a
DVD player or could easily purchase one. See id. at 34-35. These arguments do not apply here: (i)
most people have an iPod, not a Sony/Microsoft compatible MP3 player; (ii) most people do not
have more than one MP3 player; and (iii) MP3 players are still relatively expensive. See Sony
Complaint, supra note 68, 24 (describing iPod as "the dominant portable" MP3 player); Green-
berg, supra note 334 (discussing the popularity of iPod and prices of rival MP3 players).
340. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.A., 17 U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A., and 35 U.S.C.A.).
341. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201.
342. Cohen, supra note 48, at 972.
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to address the changing needs of copyright protection in a digital age,"
including digital rights management.343 More specifically, the Treaty
required contracting states to "provide adequate legal protection and ef-
fective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technologi-
cal measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention."
344
On October 12, 1998, Congress passed the DMCA, and President
Clinton signed it into law.345 Among other things, the DMCA is de-
signed to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty.346 To that end, at the
heart of the DMCA lies 17 U.S.C.A. section 1201(a)(1)(A), the anti-
circumvention provision, which prohibits a person from "circum-
vent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under" the copyright statute.347 This includes activity to
"descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or other-
wise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner." 348 In addition,
sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA, sometimes referred to
as the "anti-trafficking provisions," preclude the designing, manufactur-
ing, importing, offering to the public, or trafficking of any technology,
service, or device produced to circumvent such technological meas-
ures. 34 9 Hence, a violation of the DMCA can occur even in the absence
of copyright infringement.35 °
There are, however, seven narrow exemptions to the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA, including for: (1) nonprofit li-
braries, archives, and educational institutions to gain access to copy-
righted works to decide whether to acquire a copy of the work;351 (2) law
enforcement, intelligence, and other governmental entities to engages in
any lawful investigative activities; 352 (3) reverse engineering of computer
programs; 353 (4) encryption research; 354 (5) prevention of minors from
accessing material on the Internet;355 (6) protection of personally identi-
fying information;356 and (7) security testing.357 The DMCA further pro-
343. Id.
344. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65.
345. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. at 2860 (enacting the DMCA); Statement by
President William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 2281, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671 (Oct. 28, 1998) (sign-
ing the DMCA into law).
346. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. at 2860.
347. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(l)(A).
348. § 1201 (a)(3)(A).
349. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (3)(A).
350. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 976.
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vides that "the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the
Register of Copyrights," is required to promulgate regulations every
three years, exempting from the anti-circumvention provision, individu-
als who would otherwise be "adversely affected" in "their ability to make
noninfringing uses. '358 The current regulations, which were adopted by
the Librarian in 2003, carve out exceptions for the following four classes
of works: (1) compilations of lists of web sites that are blocked by filter-
ing software; (2) computer programs protected by dongles that cannot be
accessed due to damage, malfunction, or obsolescence; (3) computer
programs and video games in obsolete formats; and (4) literary works in
eBook format that are unavailable to disabled persons.359
In rulemaking years, like 2006, the Copyright Office solicits com-
ments from interested parties regarding proposed exemptions.3 60  This
year, the Copyright Office received close to one hundred comments,
some of which addressed the Sony rootkit incident.36' In the spring of
2006, the Copyright Office held hearings regarding the proposed exemp-
tions,362 and it is scheduled to publish its final recommendation in Octo-
ber 2006.363
2. Did Sony Customers Violate the Anti-Circumvention Provisions
of the DMCA By Removing the Copy-Prevention Software
From Their Computers?
Once the news of the rootkit broke on the Internet, many Sony cus-
tomers attempted to uninstall the copy-prevention software themselves or
hired someone to do it for them.3 4 Some expressed concern that, by
doing so, these customers may have been violating the DMCA, namely
the anti-circumvention provision set forth in 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(1)(A). 365 While these concerns are understandable, an analysis
358. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(I)(B)-(C). In making this determination, the Librarian shall con-
sider:
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works; (ii) the availability for use of works for
nonprofit archival, preservation, and educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohi-
bition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to copyrighted works has
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect
of circumvention of technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted
works; and (v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
§ 1201 (a)(l)(C)(i)-(v).
359. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40; Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 124 & n.
252 (2004).
360. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS ON ANTICIRCUMVENTION EXEMPTIONS,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
361. Id. (follow "Comment" hyperlinks).
362. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANTICIRCUMVENTION RULEMAKING HEARINGS SCHEDULE,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
363. Id.
364. See Mook, supra note 128.
365. MFC-in-the-box, Sony's XCP Rootkit and the DMCA, Nov. 22, 2005,
http://mhc.insidestretch.com/2005/l 1/22/sonys-xcp-drm-rootkit-and-the-dmca/; Declan McCullagh,




of the DMCA indicates that the current exemptions to section 1201(a)(1)
most likely would have shielded these customers from liability.
First, section 1201(j) provides an exemption for any "act of security
testing," which means "accessing a computer, computer system, or com-
puter network, solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating,
or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of
the owner or operator of such computer, computer system, or computer
network. 3 66 This exemption applies to Sony customers who, after learn-
ing about the security risks posed by the copy-prevention software, re-
moved the files from their hard drives.
Second, individuals whose computers were affected by the Media-
Max or XCP software also may have been able to invoke section 1201 (i),
the exemption relating to the protection of personally identifiable infor-
mation. That exemption provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a
violation of that subsection for a person to circumvent a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title, if-
(A) the technological measure, or the work it protects, contains the
capability of collecting or disseminating personally identifying in-
formation reflecting the online activities of a natural person who
seeks to gain access to the work protected.
367
Both the MediaMax and XCP software had "phone home" capabilities,
meaning it communicated certain information from the user's computer
to Sony's servers.368 The information communicated to Sony included,
among other things, the user's IP address.369
Computer users are assigned an IP address by their intemet service
provider or system administrator. No two IP addresses are the same.
Although some users have dynamic IP addresses, many have static ad-
dresses that do not change over time. Thus, an IP address can be used to
determine information about the computer user, including his name, ad-
dress, etc.37° In fact, this is exactly how the record companies have iden-
tified "John Doe" defendants in their litigation campaign against individ-
ual file-sharers. 37' Because an IP address constitutes "personally identify-
ing information" (or, at the very least, is an avenue to personally identifi-
Russinovich, Sony's Rootkit First 4 Internet Responds, Nov. 6, 2005,
http://www.sysintemals.com/blog/2005/1 1/sonys-rootkit-first-4-intemet.html (see replies).
366. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(j)(1), (2).
367. § 1201(i)(l)(A).
368. Russinovich Affidavit, supra note 119, 14; Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, E.
369. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, E.
370. Melcon Complaint, supra note 70, 31.
371. See supra Part I.A.2.
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able information), section 1201(i) should have protected Sony's custom-
ers from liability under the DMCA.
In sum, section 1201(i) and (j) almost certainly would have shielded
from liability Sony customers who uninstalled the copy-prevention soft-
ware from their hard drives. Yet, as explained in the next section, the
current exemptions to the DMCA may not be broad enough to protect
everyone involved in the Sony rootkit debacle from liability.
3. Did Security Researchers Violate the Anti-Trafficking Provi-
sions of the DMCA by Informing the Public About Sony's
Copy-Prevention Software?
When Mark Russinovich published his findings about the Sony
rootkit on the Internet, he apparently was not concerned about or not
aware of the potential legal exposure created by the DMCA. Others
were, however. Professor Felten and Alex Halderman, both of whom
had previously been threatened with DMCA suits, said that they had un-
covered the problem with Sony's copy-prevention software about a
month before Mr. Russinovich broke the news, but did not disclose it
because they were worried about a lawsuit.372 Those fears appear to have
been well-founded.
a. Liability Under the Anti-Trafficking Provisions of the
DMCA
In addition to prohibiting the circumvention of DRM and other
technological measures aimed at protecting copyrighted material, certain
provisions of the DMCA also make it illegal to traffic in a technology,
service, or device intended to circumvent such technological measures.
Subsection 1201(a)(2) provides:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, compo-
nent, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title; (B) has only lim-
ited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or (C) is marketed by that person or another
acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for
use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to a work protected under this title.
373
Similarly, subsection 1201(b)(1) provides:
372. Comment of Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman, Dec. 1, 2005, at 7 [hereinafter
Felten Comment], available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/mulligan felten.pdf.
373. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(2).
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No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, compo-
nent, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a technological
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof; (B) has only limited commer-
cially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right
of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that
person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protec-
tion afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof.
374
Although both subsections prohibit trafficking in a circumvention tech-
nology, the focus of section 1201(a)(2) is circumvention of technologies
designed to prevent access to a work, and the focus of section 1201(b)(1)
is circumvention of technologies designed to permit access to a work but
prevent copying of the work or some other act that infringes a copy-
right.
375
Since the DMCA was enacted in 1998, a few courts have inter-
preted the anti-trafficking provisions of that statute. One of the earliest
decisions was Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.376 In that case, sev-
eral movie studios filed a lawsuit against two website owners who,
among other things, posted links to other websites that offered for
download a computer software program called DeCSS.377 One of the
purposes of DeCSS was to circumvent CSS, an encryption system used
to prevent illegal copying of DVDs.37 8 "CSS-protected motion pictures
on DVDs may be viewed only on players and computer drives equipped
with licensed technology that permits the devices to decrypt and play-
but not to copy-the films. 379
The lower court found that by posting links to DeCSS on their web-
sites, defendants had violated section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA because
they offered and provided to the public a technology, i.e., DeCSS, that is
"primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure," i.e., CSS.38° Accordingly, the court entered a
374. § 1201(b)(I).
375. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 11-12 (1998).
376. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). The lower court decision is reported at 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
377. Corley, 273 F.3d at 435-36.
378. Id. at 436-37.
379. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
380. § 1201(a)(2)(A); Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17.
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permanent injunction against defendants, which the Second Circuit up-
held.38
More recently, in Davidson & Associates v. Jung,38 2 the Eighth Cir-
cuit faced the question whether the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA had been violated in connection with certain computer game
software. In that case, plaintiff Blizzard Entertainment ("Blizzard"), the
owner of copyrights in computer game software, launched Battle.net, a
24-hour online gaming service available only to people who purchase
Blizzard's computer games. 38 3 The Battle.net service facilitates multiple-
player games, meaning users can "create and join multi-player games
that can be accessed across the Internet, . . . chat with other potential
players,.., record wins and losses and save advancements in an individ-
ual password-protected game account, and ... participate with others in
tournament play featuring elimination rounds. 38 4
Defendants were software programmers who formed a group called
the "bnetd project. 38 5 The bnetd project established a website and of-
fered an alternative service to Battle.net, which also "allow[ed] gainers
unable or unwilling to connect to Battle.net to experience the multi-
player features of Blizzard's games. 386 In order for bnetd.org to work
with Blizzard games, defendants had to reverse engineer the game soft-
ware, including the technological measures intended to prevent illicit
387copying.
Blizzard sued defendants alleging, among other things, violations of
the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. The
court held that, by reverse engineering the Blizzard game software, de-
fendants violated section 1201 (a)(1)'s circumvention proscription, and
that no exemption applied.38 9 The court also determined that defendants
were in violation of section 1201 (a)(2) because they provided to the pub-
lic a service whose primary purpose "was to avoid the anti-
circumvention restrictions of the game and to avoid the restricted access
to Battle.net. ' 0 90 Accordingly, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Blizzard on these claims, and the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed.3 '
381. Corley, 273 F.3d at 434, 459-60.
382. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
383. Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 635.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 636.
388. ld at 637.
389. Id. at 640-41.
390. Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1186 (E.D. Mo.
2004).
391. 422 F.3d at 640-41, aff'g 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
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Although security researchers like Messrs. Russinovich, Felten, and
Halderman have not manufactured any sort of product or device to cir-
cumvent Sony's copy-prevention software, all three have provided the
public with information about the manner in which this software oper-
ates, the dangers it poses, and how it can be removed from one's hard
drive. In light of the decisions in Corley and Davidson, such conduct
arguably falls within the purview of the DMCA's anti-trafficking provi-
sions because it is a service that is being provided or offered to the public
primarily for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that
prevents access to a copyrighted work. Indeed, Professor Felten and
Alex Halderman themselves are concerned about the legality of their
conduct. Not only did they choose not to disclose their research about
Sony's copy-prevention software, but they also have asked the Copyright
Office to promulgate a regulatory exemption to the DMCA to protect
their activities in the future.
b. Proposed Exemptions to the DMCA
As mentioned above, 2006 is a rulemaking year under the DMCA,
which means the Copyright Office is considering various proposed ex-
emptions to the anti-circumvention provisions of the statute. Among the
numerous submissions received by the Copyright Office were two that
addressed, at least in part, the situation raised by the Sony rootkit deba-
cle: (1) the Comments of Edward Felten and J. Alex Halderman, submit-
ted by their legal representatives from the Samuelson Law, Technology
and Public Policy Clinic at Boalt Hall; and (2) the Comments of the
Computer and Communications Industry Association and Open Source
and Industry Alliance (collectively "CCIA").
392
Generally, these two groups requested "an exemption to §
1201 (a)(1)(A) for sound recordings and audiovisual works distributed in
compact disc format and protected by technological measures that im-
pede access to lawfully purchased works by creating or exploiting secu-
rity vulnerabilities that compromise the security of personal com-
puters. 393 They contend that such an exemption is necessary to allow
consumers to enjoy their purchased music without threatening the secu-
rity of their computers, and so that individuals like Messrs. Felten and
Halderman can engage in security research.394
392. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMMENTS ON ANTICIRCUMVENTION EXEMPTIONS,
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/index.html.
393. Felten Comment, supra note 372, at 1. The exemptions proposed by the two groups are
essentially identical and, thus, will be discussed together.
394. Id. at 6-7; see also Public Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, U.S. Copyright Office, Mar. 31,
2006, at 130-33, available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/transcript-mar31 .pdf.
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Numerous organizations, including the RIAA, submitted a joint re-
sponse to the comments proposing new exemptions to the DMCA.395
The joint response asserted that the exemption proposed by the Felten
and CCIA groups was unnecessary because, inter alia, the conduct about
which they were concerned was already exempted under sections 1201(i)
and 0).396 As discussed previously, this most likely is true with respect
to Sony customers who removed the copy-prevention software from their
computers.397
As currently drafted, however, the 12010) and (i) exemptions
probably would not protect security researchers who provide information
to the public from liability under the anti-trafficking provisions of the
DMCA. Section 1201(j) provides, for example, that
[i]n determining whether a person qualifies for the exemption under
paragraph (2), the factors to be considered shall include-(A)
whether the information derived from the security testing was used
solely to promote the security of the owner or operator of such com-
puter, computer system or computer network, or shared directly with
the developer of such computer, computer system, or computer net-
work; and (B) whether the information derived from the security test-
ing was used or maintained in a manner that does not facilitate in-
fringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than
this section, including a violation of privacy or breach of security.
398
Here, the information that Messrs. Felten, Halderman, and Russino-
vich derived from security testing was not used solely to promote the
security of their own computers, but also was used to promote the secu-
rity of other Sony customers' computers. Moreover, although the pur-
pose of disseminating such information is to promote the security of per-
sonal computers, there is no guarantee that such information will not be
used to facilitate infringement. Thus, as discussed in Part IV of this Ar-
ticle, the Copyright Office should adopt a narrowly-tailored exemption to
protect those engaged in security research from liability under the
DMCA.
IV. RECORD COMPANIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE DRM, BUT NOT
AT THE EXPENSE OF SECURITY RESEARCHERS OR CONSUMERS
Despite the complications caused by the Sony rootkit debacle, the
recording industry should continue to pursue DRM technology to prevent
the illicit copying of CDs. The recording industry has a right to protect
its intellectual property. Unlike the on-line file sharing battle, there are
no secondary infringers like Napster or Grokster that could be targeted,
395. JOINT REPLY, supra note 303, at 1.
396. Id. at 20-21.




and suing direct infringers is not practical because it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to identify individual CD burners. DRM,
therefore, is still the industry's best option. In order for future attempts
at DRM to succeed, however, lawmakers and record companies alike
must strive to balance the interest of copyright owners against the rights
of consumers.
A. What Should the Lawmakers Do?
This article has analyzed many legal issues raised by the rootkit in-
cident, including Sony's potential liability, as well as the potential liabil-
ity of consumers and researchers under the DMCA. As to the former,
there are federal and state laws available to address and remedy Sony's
conduct.399 With respect to the latter, the current exemptions to the
DMCA are not sufficient to protect security researchers from liability
and, thus, the Copyright Office should adopt a new exemption.
However, the exemption proposed by the Felten and CCIA
groups--"for sound recordings . . .distributed in compact disc format
and protected by technological measures that impede access ... by creat-
ing or exploiting security vulnerabilities that compromise . . .personal
computers"4°-is far too broad. First and foremost, it is not limited in
any way to security researchers, so it would permit anyone who believed
a copy-protected CD posed some type of security risk to circumvent the
technology. Nor does the proposed exemption attempt to define "secu-
rity vulnerabilities," so some people might interpret that term very
broadly to justify the circumvention of access controls. Undoubtedly, a
vague and overly broad exemption like this would facilitate copyright
infringement and seriously undermine the purpose served by section
1201 (a)(1)(A).
Instead, the Copyright Office should adopt a narrowly-tailored Se-
curity Research Exemption that tracks the language of section 1201(g)'s
exemption for encryption research. Section 1201(g), for example, pro-
vides a relatively straightforward definition of "encryption research" that
puts the public on notice of what activities fall within the exemption. 40 1
Section 1201(g) further provides that it is not a violation of section
120 1(a)(1)(A) "for a person to circumvent a technological measure... in
the course of an act of good faith encryption research if... such an act is
necessary to conduct such encryption research ... ,402 This type of
399. See supra Part IIL.A (discussing Sony's liability under the CFAA and Texas Spyware
Statute). This is not to suggest that Congress should not enact a federal spyware statute. While such
legislation probably is unnecessary in this case, it apparently is critical to address other serious
problems facing consumers and businesses today. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 171, at 256-57;
Blakley, supra note 173, at 40.
400. Felten Comment, supra note 372, at 1. The exemptions proposed by the two groups are
essentially identical, and thus, will be discussed together.
401. § 1201(g)(l)(A).
402. § 1201(g)(2) (emphasis added).
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limiting language, which is not found in the current security testing ex-
emption, should be included in the proposed Security Research Exemp-
tion, so that the underlying copyrighted works can be accessed if neces-
sary for the research.
Additionally, section 1201(g)'s "Factors in Determining Exemp-
tion" would be equally applicable to a Security Research Exemption.
The first asks "whether the information derived from the encryption re-
search was disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a
manner reasonably calculated to advance the state of knowledge or de-
velopment of encryption technology, versus whether it was disseminated
in a manner that facilitates infringement under this title. . .. ,40' Before
applying the Security Research Exemption, this type of inquiry would be
appropriate to ensure that information was being disseminated to the
members of the public to notify them of a valid security risk, and not
simply to educate them on how to circumvent certain access controls.4°
Similarly, section 1201(g) asks "whether the person is engaged in a
legitimate course of study, is employed, or is appropriately trained or
experienced, in the field of encryption technology. ' '4°5 A factor like this
would ensure that only legitimate security researchers would be shielded
by the exemption. Section 1201(g) finally considers "whether the person
provides the copyright owner of the work to which the technological
measure is applied with notice of the findings and documentation of the
research .... Again, a notice provision should also be included in
the proposed Security Research Exemption, thus giving the copyright
owner an opportunity to address the problem itself instead of having it
revealed by a third party as occurred in the Sony incident.
The proposed exemption outlined above would ensure that legiti-
mate security researchers could devote their time to protecting our na-
tion's computing systems and the people who use those systems, rather
than worrying about whether disseminating important security informa-
tion might expose them to a lawsuit under the DMCA. Moreover, this
exemption is sufficiently narrow to minimize the risk that individuals
could improperly invoke it in order to circumvent DRM systems for il-
licit purposes. While adoption of the proposed Security Research Ex-
emption is recommended at this time in light of recent events, the ulti-
mate goal is for record companies to adjust their approach and attitude
403. § 1201(g)(3)(A).
404. While Felten and Halderman's work is primarily focused on exposing security vulner-
abilities created by various DRM systems, there are some instances where they seem simply to be
instructing the public on circumvention techniques. See, e.g., Halderman & Felten, supra note 62, at
6 (explaining how to bypass XCP's temporary protection measure by "kill[ing] the installer process"
or "us[ing] a ripping or copying program that locks the CD tray," even though there is no indication





toward copy-protecting CDs, so as to avoid another Sony rootkit debacle
in the future.
B. What Should the Record Companies Do?
Record companies need to take a different approach to copy-
protecting CDs. First, they need to invest the time and resources neces-
sary to ensure their copy-prevention systems do not pose any sort of se-
curity threat to their customers. The record labels and the software de-
signers must make security a priority so consumers can feel confident
that playing copy-protected CDs on their computers will not pose a risk
to their operating systems. Moreover, before releasing CDs with copy-
protection software, all record companies should do what Sony is re-
quired to do by the Settlement Agreement in the Consolidated Action:
have the software analyzed by an independent, third-party and get an
opinion that installation and use of the software would create no security
vulnerabilities for users.4 °7
Second, it is vital that record companies provide consumers with
sufficient notice that CDs contain anti-piracy technology. Record labels
not only should include conspicuous warnings on the CDs, but they
should widely publicize the fact that certain copy-protected CDs are go-
ing to be released. Additionally, consumers must be fully informed
about the nature of the DRM (i.e., what it does, how it operates, etc.).
That information, of course, should be included in the EULA, but also
should be made easily available to customers, for example by posting it
on the label's website. Indeed, one reason Apple has been successful
with its use of DRM in iTunes music is because "Apple is above the
board .... .40'
Third, while it would be impossible to ensure that copy-protected
CDs can be listened to on any device, record companies must develop
DRM systems that take into account the reality of today's technological
landscape. Specifically, a significant number of customers use portable
music players, and Apple's iPod is by far the most popular of these de-
vices. The bottom line is that if record companies release copy-protected
CDs that are not compatible with iPods, and consumers are not aware of
that at the time of purchase, music fans with be angry and/or will attempt
to circumvent the DRM. While it is understandable that Sony would
prefer its customers to listen to Sony CDs on a Sony MP3 player, that is
simply not the reality of today's society. In other words, the record
companies cannot use copy-protection as a means to promote their own
portable devices. If record labels want to copy-protect CDs, they must
accept that most customers will want to listen to those CDs on an iPod.
407. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, IV.B.3(f).
408. Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies" Next Flop?, supra note 294.
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Finally, the sole purpose of any successful DRM system must be to
prevent illicit copying, not to collect personal information or advertise.
This is addressed in the Settlement Agreement in the Consolidated Ac-
tion, but it does not go far enough. There, Sony agreed that, before re-
leasing CDs with copy-prevention software, it will ensure that such soft-
ware "make[s] a record only of the associated album title, artist, IP ad-
dress from which the [Internet] connection was made, and certain non-
personally identifiable information .... ,409 As discussed above, how-
ever, IP addresses are personally identifiable information. There is no
reason record labels should be able to collect this information from indi-
viduals who are simply listening to CDs on their computers (as opposed
to people who are illegally downloading music from the Internet). If
record companies continue to gather such data, it will further erode cus-
tomer confidence and undermine the chance of finding an approach to
DRM that is acceptable to the entertainment industry and consumers.
CONCLUSION
This latest chapter in the saga of the war on music piracy has forced
the recording industry, lawmakers, and consumers to take a hard look at
the issues surrounding the use of digital rights management to protect
copyright owners. In this case, Sony clearly went too far in attempting to
defend its intellectual property rights. As a result, it violated numerous
laws and has subjected itself to very serious consequences, including
several class action lawsuits, a criminal case in Texas, numerous gov-
ernment inquiries, and a public relations disaster.
The record companies nonetheless have a right to prevent illicit
copying of their music, and, at least for the time being, digital rights
management is the best way to accomplish that. In designing future
DRM systems, the recording industry should take a lesson from Apple,
who has made its iTunes DRM work by "think[ing] seriously about bal-
ancing the needs of content owners with those of consumers," and "at-
tempt[ing] to satisfy both sides of the equation."4 10 If the recording in-
dustry can do that and can develop DRM that satisfies the requirements
outlined in this article, consumers would learn to accept the copy-
protection technology and would adapt their music consumption habits
accordingly.
409. Settlement Agreement, supra note 63, IV.B.3(g).
410. Digital Rights Management (DRM): Media Companies 'Next Flop?, supra note 294.
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